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A Plea for a Comprehensive
Governmental Liability Statute
BY Roy KIMBERLY SNELL*
INTRODUCTION
Kentucky courts have long clothed the state's municipal cor-
porations in some variety of the antiquated concept of sovereign
immunity.' Uncomfortable with the harshness of absolute im-
munity, however, the courts have labored to achieve a just
equilibrium between the interests of local governments and their
injured citizens. Unfortunately, from the early "governmental/
proprietary" distinction2 to the "ultimate function" fiasco of
* Associate in the firm of Stites & Harbison, Louisville, Kentucky. B.A. 1973,
University of Texas; M.A. 1976, University of Virginia; J.D. 1981, University of Texas.
I I will spare the reader a detour into the tortuous history of sovereign'immunity
in England and America. Others have exhausted the subject. See, e.g., 3 W. HoLDs-
woRTH, HISTORY OF ENGI SH LAW 464-66 (3d ed.); Borchard, Governmental Responsi-
bility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926); Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE
L.J. 1 (1924); Jaffe, Suits Against Government and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARv. L. REv. 1 (1963); Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity, 13 LA. L. REv. 476 (1953). The Kentucky Court of Appeals recently distin-
guished "sovereign" immunity from "municipal" immunity. Inco, Ltd. v. Lexington-
Fayette Urban County Airport Bd., 32 Ky. L. Suziii. 16, at 3 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 22,
1985) [hereinafter cited as KLS]. The distinction is a useful one, see notes 13 and 14
infra & accompanying text, but all forms of governmental immunity are historically
related in Kentucky.
As for the sartorial metaphor, it is an obligatory feature of the subject. Sovereign
or governmental immunity has been variously described as "armour," Haney v. City of
Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Ky. 1964), and a "cloak," Frankfort, Variety, Inc. v.
City of Frankfort, 552 S.W.2d 653, 654 (Ky. 1977). In short, the government is "clothed
with immunity from tort liability." Hempel v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't,
641 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
2 Kentucky courts struggled with the distinction between "governmental" func-
tions, which were immune from tort liability, and "proprietary" functions, which were
not, until the Kentucky Supreme Court abolished the distinction in Haney v. City of
Lexington, 386 S.W.2d at 742. The distinction produced a dizzying line of cases con-
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more recent years,3 none has worked. Thoughtful jurists, law-
yers, and laymen have expressed concern over the inequities and
uncertainty that have resulted, 4 but no one has proposed, nor
has the judiciary concocted, a successful judicial standard for
balancing these compelling but competing interests. Meanwhile
the Kentucky General Assembly has elected to leave the struggle
to the courts.
Gas Service Co. v. City of London5 is merely the latest
episode in the judicial struggle. The decision boldly purports to
have disrobed municipalities once and for all, exposing them to
legal liability of unknown dimensions.6 Yet, as a vocal minority
of the Court quickly observed, the opinion in fact leaves several
scraps of material clinging to the municipal body.1 Reviving an
exception originally devised in Haney v. City of Lexingtons-an
ominous choice, since the Court in that decision also announced
the destruction of municipal immunity over twenty years ago-
the court preserved immunity for "the exercise of legislative or
judicial or quasi-legislative or quasi-functions." 9 As shall be
seen, the illustrations offered by the Court to exemplify such
functions promise to play havoc with its desire to restrict future
reliance on traditional immunity.' 0 Gas Service only assures that
lawyers for plaintiffs and defendants alike will have their work
cut out for them in stitching together or unraveling the fabric
of this latest judicial exception.
taining inconsistencies that the Haney Court attributed to "the fact that the courts for
many years have been repelled by the injustice of the rule of municipal immunity and
have attempted to soften its harsh application by seeking a few escape hatches." Id. at
740. See also Antieau, The Tort Liability of American Municipalities, 40 Ky. L.J. 131
(1951-52).
Tort immunity for "ultimate functions of government" originated with City of
Louisville v. Louisville Seed Co., 433 S.W.2d 638, 643 (Ky. 1968). See text accompanying
notes 46-48 infra.
I See, e.g., Cullinan v. Jefferson County, 418 S.W.2d 407, 411-12 (Ky. 1967)
(Palmore, J., dissenting); Courier-Journal, Aug. 29, 1985, at BI, col. 1.
687 S.W.2d 144 (Ky. 1985).
6 See id. at 151 (Wintersheimer, J., concurring).
' See id. at 150-52 (Wintersheimer, J., concurring); id. at 152-53 (Stephenson, J.,
dissenting).
386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964).
687 S.V.2d at 149.
" See text accompanying notes 126-131, infra.
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Although now revitalized, Haney stands as a solemn re-
minder to litigants that no judicially constructed standard can
ever solve the perpetual problem of municipal immunity. Deter-
mining under what circumstances and to what extent a municipal
corporation can assume responsibility for harm arising from its
provision of services without jeopardizing those services is a
complex task suitable only for legislative study and experimen-
tation. The Kentucky Supreme Court might have served its pur-
pose better by abolishing immunity without exception, not because
local governments do not need protection in many areas, but
because it appears that only total judicial abdication will ever
prod the Kentucky General Assembly into confronting the prob-
lem. As it stands," Gas Service, like Haney, threatens munici-
palities with a new era of wasteful combat over the boundaries
of the "quasi-legislative/judicial" exception.
We can only hope that the General Assembly will-avoid this
needless repetition of the judicial turmoil of the last two decades
by enacting a comprehensive governmental liability statute. In
its regular session for 1986, the General Assembly permitted
House Bill 120, which limited the tort liability of- municipal and
county governments in response to Gas Service, to die in com-
mittee on the last day of the session. The principal goal of this
Article is to state the case for ending this course of legislative
neglect. Section one traces the recent history of governmental
immunity in Kentucky, a curious sequence of events that amply
supports a plea for legislative action. Section two examines more
fully the Gas Service decision and the way it compounds rather
than solves the problems surrounding municipal immunity. Fi-
nally, section three offers a brief look at some of the issues that
the Kentucky General Assembly should consider in devising a
statutory solution. The inescapable conclusion is that Kentucky
can no longer leave to the judiciary a critical task for which it
is not equipped.
One of the principal theses of this Article is that the Gas Service Court preserved
a workable exception to the rule of municipal immunity, but then took the unnecessary




I. THE STRANGE CAREER OF GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY IN KENTUCKY
The doctrine of governmental immunity has developed dif-
ferently at every level of political organization in Kentucky-
state, county, and municipal. Ironically, it is the local govern-
ments, those with the most direct impact on the populace, that
have enjoyed the broadest and most durable immunity. 2 More
ironic still is the degree to which municipal immunity, purely a
creature of the courts,'3 has evolved into the yardstick by which
courts measure the liability of the Commonwealth of Kentucky
itself, whose immunity is supposedly constitutional in origin.'
4
The reader must have some familiarity with the immunity doc-
trine at the state, county, and municipal levels to understand the
significance of Gas Service Co. v. City of London-the latest
development in municipal liability.
A. The Origins and Course of Immunity at the State Level
The present Kentucky Constitution provides that "[t]he Gen-
eral Assembly may, by law, direct in what manner and in what
court suits may be brought against the Commonwealth.' 5 The
provision closely follows a passage of the original constitution
of 1792, but differs in one interesting, if now inconsequential,
respect. The original document asserted that the legislature "shall
direct" the manner of bringing suit.' 6 The mandatory "shall"
seems to have intended less a blanket immunity, the prerogative
of a discarded king, 7 than a directive that the popular govern-
ment control the procedure by which claims might be asserted
against it. In those days of limited if not nonexistent government
services, the matter must have appeared less than pressing. For
whatever reason, the Kentucky General Assembly established a
2 See Gas Service Co. v. City of London, 687 S.W.2d 144 (Ky. 1985).
See Haney v. City of LexingtOn, 386 S.W.2d 738, 739 (Ky. 1964).
" This strange and mistaken event occured in Commonwealth, Dep't of Banking
and Securities v. Brown, 605 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Ky. 1980), the bete noire of this tale.
See text accompanying notes 24-27, 62-63 infra.
" Ky. CONST. § 231.
KY. CONST. of 1792, art. VIII, § 4.
" See W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note I, at 464-66.
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pattern of inactivity that permitted the doctrine of absolute
immunity to put down roots. 8 Not until 1828 did the courts
find occasion to consider the matter, by which time the General
Assembly had fixed its course of neglect. "Although the consti-
tution has declared, that 'The General Assembly shall direct by
law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought
against the Commonwealth,' " the Court noted in barring a suit
against the state, "that body has never complied with this direc-
tion. .... ",19
Once planted by legislative default, immunity flourished. To
this day, the Commonwealth remains immune from suit at com-
mon law in both contract and tort, and only the Kentucky
General Assembly has the power to waive immunity as a de-
fense. 20 Not until 1946 did the passage of the Board of Claims
Act ("the Act") finally provide some recourse against the state.2'
The Act originally provided only for claims arising from the
negligent design and construction of highways, 22 but the legis-
lature amended it in 1950 to offer compensation to "persons for
damages sustained to either person or property as a proximate
result of negligence on the part of the Commonwealth or its
departments or agencies, or any of its agents or employees while
acting within the scope of their employment. "23 The current
version of the Act does not permit compensation for pain and
suffering, however, and single awards cannot exceed fifty thou-
sand dollars exclusive of interest and costs.
24
Although counties and municipal corporations have always
been offshoots of the state government, 21 the Act did not include
them by name. The question of their inclusion in the Act's
limited abrogation of immunity arose in Ginter v. Montgomery
1 Divine v. Harvie, 23 Ky. (7 T.B. Mon.) 439, 441 (1828).
Id.
See University of Louisville v. Martin, 574 S.W.2d 676, 677 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978).
21 Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 176.290-.380 (1948) [hereinafter cited as KRS] (renumbered
KRS §§ 44.070-.160 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980)). See generally Richardson, Kentucky Board
of Claims, 35 KY. L.J. 295 (1947).
KRS §§ 176.290-.380 (1948).
"' KRS § 44.070 (1950) (current version at KRS § 44.070 (1980 & Supp. 1984)).
KRS §§ 44.070(1)-(5) (1980 & Supp. 1984).
- See Monroe County v. Rowe, 274 S.W.2d 477, 478 (Ky. 1954).
1985-86]
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County,26 a wrongful death action against a county and its fiscal
court. The Court declared that the Act "does not completely
abrogate the doctrine of immunity even as to the state govern-
ment, and as to the local government it does not purport to
waive any immunity.''27 Following this reasoning, the Court in
Gnau v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer
District28 insisted that the sewer district, a municipal corporation,
"is not one of the branches of the government which is included
in the waiver by the subject statute. ' 29 Ginter and Gnau seemed
to ensure that counties and municipal corporations would remain
immune pending further legislative action.
Even at the state level, constitutional immunity continued to
be an absolute bar to breach of contract claims. Overruling
precedent to the contrary, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Foley
Construction Co. v. Ward"' held that governmental immunity
barred a contract claim against the Department of Highways
both for the contract price and for consequential damages.3 '
Foley Construction caused the Kentucky General Assembly to
enact a statutory remedy for contract claims against the Com-
monwealth.32 Again, however, the statute authorized only claims
against the "Commonwealth of Kentucky and any of its de-
partments or agencies, ' 33 the same language construed by the
21 327 S.W.2d 98 (Ky. 1959).
21 Id. at 100.
21 346 S.W.2d 754 (Ky. 1961).
Id. at 755.
375 S.W.2d 392 (Ky. 1963).
" Id. at 396.
32 KRS §§ 45A.245-.295 (1980). Other statutes subsequently established remedies
against the government in specific areas. For example, legislation passed in 1976 au-
thorized the attorney general to undertake the defense of state employees in civil actions.
KRS §§ 12.211-12.215 (1985). Regulations passed pursuant to the statute enable the state
to insure the acts of its employees for up to $50,000, 10 Ky. AMIN. REGs. 1:010 (1985),
but the attorney general can decline to provide a defense for several reasons, the vaguest
of which is a determination that "[d]efense of the action would not be in the best
interests of the Commonwealth." KRS § 12.212(I)(d). See also Comment, The Employe
Defense Act: Wearing Down Sovereign Immunity, 66 KY. L.J. 150 (1977-78).
Counties may elect to purchase liability insurance, thereby waiving immunity to
the extent of coverage for motor vehicles, KRS §§ 67.180-185 (1980), and county-operated
hospitals, KRS § 67.186 (1980). School districts similarly may insure their buses. KRS §
160.310 (1980).
" KRS § 45A.240 (1980).
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Court in Gnau as inapplicable to county and municipal govern-
ments.
3 4
The interpretation of the Act to exclude local governments
from the legislative waiver of immunity was questionable but
defensible. If the Kentucky General Assembly had meant to
include counties and cities in its program, it certainly had chosen
a mealy-mouthed way of doing so. Still, the separation of local
governments from the "Commonwealth" contained an impor-
tant implication. If counties and cities were not agencies of the
state, was not the extension of immunity to them less a matter
of constitutional mandate than judicial whim? This was the
conclusion that the Court ultimately reached, at least with re-
spect to municipalities a.3 Nevertheless, a startling decision by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in 1980 inextricably linked the statu-
tory liability of the Commonwealth to the common law of
municipal immunity.
Commonwealth, Department of Banking and Securities v.
Brown 6 began as a suit before the Board of Claims in which
claimants alleged that examiners of the Department of Banking
and Securities had performed negligently in the regulation of
two building and loan associations. The Board of Claims found
that the examiners had been derelict in not ascertaining and
reporting the true condition of the associations' records, and
two intermediate courts upheld this conclusion. A unanimous
Supreme Court agreed. It observed, however, that the Act offers
a remedy only for "such negligence ... as would entitle claimant
to a judgment in an action at law if the state were amenable to
such action."'3 7 Reasoning that cities were the only units of
government "amenable" to suit when the General Assembly
" See 346 S.W.2d at 755.
" In V.T.C. Lines, Inc. v. City of Harlan, 313 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Ky. 1957), the
Court described the doctrine of municipal immunity as a feature of common law. A
majority of the Court in V.T.C. Lines declined to abolish the doctrine, resolving that
"change addresses itself to legislative discretion and ... we must content ourselves only
with criticism of the rule which we have created." Id. The Court later changed course
and abolished municipal immunity-temporarily-in Haney v. City of Lexington, 386
S.W.2d at 742. See text accompanying notes 79-87 infra.
605 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1980).
X7 KRS § 44.120 (1980).
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passed the Board of Claims Act,38 the Court divined in this
phrase of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 44.120 a
legislative intent that the Commonwealth have no greater expo-
sure to liability under the Act than municipalities have under
the common law. 9
Banking and Securities is an extraordinary example of judi-
cial legislation in the guise of interpretation. The Court took a
statute passed by the Kentucky General Assembly pursuant to
section 231 of the Kentucky Constitution and, without any au-
thorization from the statute itself, restricted its scope to an area
controlled and regularly changed by the judiciary-the common
law of municipal immunity. Of course, mere use of the word
"negligence" in the Act gives the courts a voice in defining its
scope; the judiciary alters the meaning of that word whenever it
recognizes a new type of liability/ ° By importing the chaos of
its decisions on municipal liability into the Act, however, the
Court hitched the statute not to its traditional area of expertise-
the common law of negligence-but to an area of public policy
in which it was already usurping the role of the legislature with
poor results.
41
The Court's decisions on municipal liability inevitably as-
sumed added importance after Banking and Securities. Petition-
13 605 S.W.2d at 499.
'9 Id. The Court's explanation for its interpretation of KRS § 44.120 was so
implausible that the absence of any dissent is remarkable. What did the General Assembly
mean by the phrase "in an action at law, if the state were amenable to such action"?
The plaintiffs in Banking and Securities suggested that the legislature intended for the
Commonwealth to receive the same treatment as a private individual. Id. The Court
found that insertion of the words "private individual" into the Act required "the
straining of the language of KRS § 44.120." Id. The Court, however, found no difficulty
in inserting the word "municipalities." Id. Ironically, the Court had indicated in an
earlier opinion "that a municipality shall be liable in those situations where a private
person would be liable." See City of Louisville v. Louisville Seed Co., 433 S.W.2d 638,
643 (Ky. 1968).
The Court tied the scope of the Act to its own ever-shifting concept of municipal
immunity rather than to the law as it existed in 1950. Thus, inherent in Banking and
Securities is the principle that the Kentucky Supreme Court can restore absolute immunity
to the Commonwealth, effectively repealing the Board of Claims Act, simply by holding
that municipalities are absolutely immune at common law. See 605 S.W.2d at 499. Surely
the Kentucky General Assembly would have been more explicit in conferring such power
on the judiciary.
See 605 S.W.2d at 499.
" See id. at 499-500.
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ers seeking relief in the Board of Claims must now look to the
law of municipal liability to find whether they have a cause of
action.42 This was no small undertaking in 1980, and it is not
an easy task today in the wake of Gas Service. Suddenly, the
Commonwealth is not liable under the Act for claims arising
from its exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-
judicial functions. 43 And what might they be? The Kentucky
Supreme Court suggested in Gas Service that those in need of
clarification or example look to none other than Banking and
Securities," a case that has assumed an inordinately fateful role
in Kentucky's law of governmental immunity.
The Court's most recent decision on the liability of the
Commonwealth itself is Dunlap v. University of Kentucky Stu-
dent Health Services Clinic.45 Addressing a suit for medical
malpractice filed by a former patient at the University of Ken-
tucky Medical Center, the Court interpreted the University of
Kentucky Medical Center Malpractice Act of 197646 as a "partial
waiver of governmental immunity for the hospital to the extent
that this insurance fund has been provided for by the statute.
'47
Whether the legislature intended this statute as a waiver of the
state hospital's immunity or merely as a means of satisfying
judgments against the hospital in the Board of Claims and
judgments at law against hospital personnel is open to question.
If the Court too liberally defined the legislative objective, how-
ever, the fault must lie with the General Assembly and its habit
of enacting ciphers.
Whatever its merits, the Court's holding in Dunlap is unlikely
to exert much influence in the law of governmental liability. The
Court's reconciliation of its decision with the precedent of Moores
v. Fayette County,48 in which it had barred a slip-and-fall
claim against a county despite the existence of insurance cover-
12 See id. at 499.
' See Gas Service Co. v. City of London, 687 S.W.2d at 149.
Id. For a critique of this further intrusion of Banking and Securities, see the
text accompanying notes 66-71 infra.
" No. 84-SC-679-DG (Ky. Feb. 27, 1986).
- KRS §§ 164.939-.944 (1980 & Supp. 1985).
" No. 84-SC-679-DG, slip op. at 9.
" 418 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1967). The Court's discussion of Moores in Dunlap appears
at pages 7-8 of the slip opinion.
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age, suggests that the Court is not prepared to read a waiver of
immunity into every insurance policy purchased by government.
Potentially much more important than the holding in Dunlap
are the Court's rumblings on the scope of section 231 and,
specifically, its application to counties.
B. County Immunity
The law of county immunity has become a peculiar hybrid
of state immunity, which clearly is constitutional in origin,49 and
municipal immunity, which the courts now view as a matter of
common law.5 0 Kentucky's highest Court established in 1967,
for example, that counties remain immune from tort liability
and that this immunity is constitutional.' In Cullinan v. Jeffer-
son County,5 2 the Court held that "Jefferson County is a polit-
ical subdivision of the Commonwealth as well, and as such is
an arm of the state government. It, too, is clothed with the same
sovereign immunity. ' ' 53 The Court dutifully noted that the Ken-
tucky General Assembly is free to waive this immunity, but
insisted that "this Court should not invade the constitutional
authority of the General Assembly by holding that the doctrine
of sovereign immunity does not bar a court action against Jef-
ferson County or the Jefferson County Board of Education.
' 5 4
Justice Palmore, in an emotional dissent savaging the prin-
ciple of local governmental immunity in general, argued that
there is no legal or semantic basis for stretching the language of
section 231 of the Kentucky Constitution to immunize counties
or other local governmental units.5 Nevertheless, the combined
effect of Cullinan and Ginters6 was to insulate completely Ken-
19 KY. CONST. § 231.
0 See Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d at 739.
" Cullinan v. Jefferson County, 418 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Ky. 1967).
52 Id.
'3 Id. at 408. But cf. Brown v. Marshall County, 394, F.2d 498, 499-500 (6th Cir.
1968), a post-Cullinan federal decision holding that Kentucky counties are liable in tort
for creating a nuisance. There is no way to reconcile Brown with Cullinan or subsequent
decisions by Kentucky courts, but there it stands, a caveat to the complacent and an
enticement to the forum shopper.
418 S.W.2d at 409.
Id. at 411 (Palmore, J., dissenting).
See text accompanying notes 26-27, supra.
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tucky's county governments from tort claims. They became "arms
of the state" under the constitution, but not "departments" or
"agencies" under the Board of Claims Act. The Kentucky Court
of Appeals not unexpectedly has extended this immunity to
urban-county governments.
7
Cullinan, however, may not be as firmly established a prec-
edent as it appears. Although the Kentucky Court of Appeals
recently concluded that Gas Service does not affect the immunity
of counties,58 the higher Court may be awaiting an opportunity
to deal immunity yet another blow. One of the arguments as-
serted by the plaintiff in Dunlap was that the immunity created
by section 231 should extend only to claims upon the state
treasury. Justice Liebson's opinion for the Court recognized
Justice Palmore's dissent in Cullinan as the source of this attack,
but declined, for the present, to reconsider the validity of Cul-
tinan. Opting for the argument on waiver, the Court did not
take up what Justice Liebson described as "the larger question
of whether to restrict 'claims against the Commonwealth' as
used in Sec. 231 of the Constitution to claims 'upon the state
treasury.' "9 If this is foreshadowing, it does not bode well for
county treasuries. Judicial restriction of section 231 to claims
upon the state treasury probably would accompany the judicial
abolition of county immunity along the lines of Gas Service.
More importantly, it would severely weaken the power of the
General Assembly to regulate claims against counties. 6°
Even more unsettled than the vitality of Cullinan as a shield
against tort suits is whether and to what extent a county is
subject to contract claims. The logic of Cullinan made this a
constitutional question requiring a legislative waiver of immu-
nity,6' just as Foley Construction held that the state was immune
" Hempel v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 641 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1982). See also Inco, Ltd. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Board, 32
KLS 16, at 3 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985). In Hempel, the court quoted section 231 of the
Kentucky Constitution and reiterated that "[t]he county is a political subdivision of the
state and is clothed with immunity from tort liability." Id. Lest one imagine that we
have reached unassailable precedent at last, take a look at Brown v. Marshall County,
394 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1968).
See 32 KLS 16, at 3.
I d.
" See text accompanying notes 107-09, infra.
418 S.W.2d at 409.
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from contract claims in the absence of a statute. 62 The Kentucky
Supreme Court eventually adopted this reasoning in George M.
Eady Co. v. Jefferson County,63 a decision written, ironically,
by Justice Palmore. Still obviously chagrined by the Court's
Cullinan decision, Judge Palmore nevertheless adhered strictly
to the logical command of that decision, concluding with a
pointed aside to the legislature:
Observing that as a result of Foley the General Assembly in
1966 had responded with legislation authorizing suits against
the Commonwealth for breach of contract, the Cullinan opin-
ion.., expressed confidence that the General Assembly would
exercise the same discretion with respect to county immunity
if and when so prompted by public sentiment. Thus far, how-
ever, it does not seem to have felt such a call, and counties
continue to enjoy their singular protection from the inroads
of justice. 64
Just when the county treasury appeared to have been locked,
however, along came Illinois Central Gulf Railroad v. Graves
County Fiscal Court.65 The Kentucky Court of Appeals con-
cluded that a county was not immune from liability on a lawful
contract requiring it to reimburse the plaintiff railroad for the
erection of a flashing signal light. The court relied upon a line
of pre-Cullinan decisions upholding the rule that "a county
cannot be sued, unless there is a statute which expressly author-
izes such an act to be maintained, or the right to do so can be
necessarily implied from an express power given, or it may be
sued upon an express contract which the county has authority
to make. '" 66
Unquestionably, the Graves County decision reached a just
result; there is no reason for a county or any other governmental
unit to escape responsibility for its breach of a contract into
which it has lawfully entered. Like so many decisions on im-
375 S.W.2d at 396.
551 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. 1977).
"4 Id. at 572.
676 S.W.2d 470 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).




munity, however, Graves County reached a laudable objective
only at the expense of precedent standing squarely in the way.
Casually circumventing the Kentucky Supreme Court's dictates
in Eady, the court of appeals explained that Eady "neither
specifically overruled the long established precedent expressing
the traditional rule with respect to the contracts of counties, nor
did it appear to consider it.' ' 67 While this may be a fair criticism
of Eady,63 it does not support the offhand conclusion that the
Supreme Court's holding in that case "was intended to apply
only to the specific kind of claim involved there" 69-procure-
ment of right-of-way titles70-"and not to an action such as this
to recover the amount agreed by the parties to be paid upon the
performance of a contract with a county." '7'
It is hazardous to predict what the current Kentucky Supreme
Court would conclude in a case raising the issue of county
immunity in contract or tort, although immunity clearly is out
of favor once again. For now, Gas Service like Haney before it,
stops short of serving as a license to sue counties. 72 Again, the
result is ironic: Gas Service will set the boundaries for claims
against the Commonwealth itself, but its effect on the liability
of a county probably is nil. Again, the only remedy for this
anomaly is a comprehensive statute establishing the liability of
every governmental tier.
C. Municipal Liability in Tort
In 1951, an article in the Kentucky Law Journal73 conve-
niently summarized the status of municipal tort liability in most
676 S.W.2d at 472.
Actually, the result in Eady was inevitable unless the Court was willing to
overrule Ginter and Culinan. Only by confessing error and declaring that county
immunity was purely a common law contraption, as it had for municipal immunity,
could the Court have justified a different result in Eady.
676 S.W.2d at 472.
See 551 S.W.2d at 572.
676 S.W.2d at 472.
72 In Culinan the Court firmly rejected an argument that Haney abolished im-
munity for counties as well as municipalities. "The decision in Haney was expressly
limited to a municipal corporation and the sovereign immunity of the state was again
recognized." 418 S.W.2d at 408. Gas Service merely reaffirms Haney, and the court of
appeals already has confined Gas Service to the field of municipal liability. See 32 KLS
16, at 3.
" Antieau, supra note 2, at 133.
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American jurisdictions. "Most frequently in determining the
existence of municipal tort liability," Professor Antieau ex-
plained, "courts distinguish between 'governmental' or 'public'
and 'proprietary' or 'private' activities, admitting civic liability
for the latter but not for the former." 74 Professor Antieau noted
that courts continued to apply these unserviceable distinctions
despite criticism from innumerable courts and scholars. Ken-
tucky was safely among the jurisdictions protecting all "govern-
mental" functions from liability in tort.
7
1
Seven years later, the Florida Supreme Court took the plunge
and abolished municipal immunity along with the "governmen-
tal/proprietary" standard. 76 The decision was a landmark, in-
augurating a nationwide trend. 77 The decisions abrogating
municipal immunity were forceful, even passionate. A zealous
concurrence to the decision overturning the common law doc-
trine in Michigan ranged from Julius Caesar to the Prisoner of
Zenda in composing the elegy for immunity.
78
' Id.
75 Strangely, municipal liability in contract has never generated controversy. The
germinal case on this subject is Murphy v. City of Louisville, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 189
(1872), in which the Court, after discussing at length the difference between public and
private corporations, concluded that a municipal corporation is liable on a contract
executed in accordance with law:
When one has a valid and binding contract with a corporation through its
agents, and has suffered loss by the neglect of the corporation to perform
some act or discharge some duty with reference to contact of which the
contracting party is not required to take notice, the corporation is liable;
or where such a contract has been violated by the corporation the right of
the contracting party injured by this non-compliance to recover damages
is unquestioned.
Id. at 197. See also Trustees of Bellview v. Hohn, 82 Ky. 1, 3 (1884).
After the emergence of the "governmental/proprietary" distinction, the act of
entering into a contract was construed as a nonexempt proprietary function of govern-
ment. See, e.g., Davis v. Comm'rs of Sewerage, 13 F. Supp. 672, 678 (W.D. Ky. 1936).
Numerous cases have tacitly recognized contract actions against municipal or quasi-
municipal corporations. See, e.g., City of Louisville v. Rockwell Manufacturing Co.,
482 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1973); Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist.
v. City of Strathmore Manor, 211 S.W.2d 127 (Ky. 1948); Bond Bros. v. Louisville &
Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 211 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1948).
" See Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
" See Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1193 (1958).
1 Williams v. City of Detroit, Ill N.W.2d 1, 10-20 (Mich. 1961) (Black, J.,
concurring). I should pause here, lest this Article seem to single out Kentucky's courts
for harsh treatment, to note that Michigan's judicial abolition of municipal immunity
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Kentucky courts followed these events fitfully. In V. T. C.
Lines v. City of Harlan,79 Chief Justice Moreman wrote an
opinion harshly deploring the continued vitality of municipal
immunity in Kentucky. 0 The Court declined to follow the Flor-
ida trend only because the rule of immunity had become "so
embedded in the law of this state" that the desired change could
flow only from legislative action.8' Still, by 1963, when Justice
Montgomery authored the decision in Foley Construction Co. v.
Ward 2 barring contract claims against the state, immunity was
back in favor. The Foley Construction decision recounted the
historical basis of the rule in Kentucky and praised the sound
fiscal policy behind it.83 The Court's fidelity to tradition, plus
the marked shift in tone since V.T.C. Lines, indicated that
Kentucky's municipalities would continue to enjoy immunity
until the General Assembly said otherwise.
The only rule to have survived throughout the years in this
area is that prediction is impossible, reliance upon precedent a
precarious venture. Seven months after Foley Construction came
Haney v. City of Lexington, 4 in which Justice Moreman, author
of V.T.C. Lines and lone dissenter in Foley Construction, led
the majority in the judicial abolition of municipal immunity."5
was also the first step into a quagmire. Ross v. Consumers Power Co., 363 N.W.2d 641
(Mich. 1984), is the most recent effort to untie the knot and provides the reader a quick
study in Michigan's troubles with the subject. Without exception, governmental immunity
has baffled the courts in every jurisdiction.
313 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1957).
Id. at 578.
I' d.
375 S.W.2d 392. The Court in Foley emphasized the historical tradition of the
doctrine in Kentucky and praised the sound public policy behind it, quoting Taylor v.
Westerfield, 26 S.W.2d 557, 557-58 (Ky. 1930):
The reason for exempting a municipality or sovereign from damages for
injuries inflicted in the performance of its governmental functions is one
of public policy to protect public funds and public property. Taxes are
raised for certain specific governmental purposes, and, if they could be
diverted to the payment of damages claims, the more important work of
government, which every municipality or sovereign must perform, regard-
less of its other relations, would be seriously impaired, if not totally
destroyed. The reason for the exemption is sound and unobjectionable.
375 S.W.2d at 393.
Id. at 393-94.
386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964).
Id. at 742.
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The decision permitted a damage suit by a father whose child
had drowned in a city swimming pool. Lamely explaining that
its deference to the legislature in V.T.C. Lines had been incor-
rect-"[a] great number of the legislators are not lawyers nor
are they interested in the details of law" 86-the Court announced
the new rule in an ill-starred phrase: "Perhaps clarity will be
afforded by our expression that henceforward, so far as govern-
mental responsibility for torts is concerned, the rule is liability-
the exception is immunity.
87
Whatever clarity Haney afforded was short-lived. A mere
four years later, in City of Louisville v. Louisville Seed Co.,13
immunity once again became the rule. Rebuffing a business's
claim for damages suffered because of the city's failure to install
gates in its municipal flood wall system, the Court silently dis-
carded its exception for "legislative/judicial" functions. Instead,
it emphasized the "crushing burden" that could fall upon mu-
nicipalities were the courts to permit tort suits for negligence
arising from "a risk which is inherently part of the carrying on
of the function of government, such as its failure to provide fire
protection, police protection or, as here, flood protection." 9
Perhaps sensing the enormity of the "exception" it had created
so soon after Haney, however, the Court tried to limit its holding
in a passage that was to sow much confusion:
Where the act affects all members of the general public alike,
it would be unreasonable to apply to it the broad principle of
tort liability for the reasons previously stated in this opinion.
But, when the city, by its dealings or activities, seeks out or
separates the individual from the general public and deals with
him on an individual basis, as any other person might do, it
then should be subjected to the same rules of tort liability as
are generally applied between individuals. This, likewise, is
true when the negligent act of the city perchance falls upon
the isolated citizen as distinguished from the public. When that
Id. at 741.
'7 Id. at 742.
433 S.W.2d 638 (Ky. 1968). A previous decision held the City of Louisville liable
for a city policeman's negligent driving. City of Louisville v. Chapman, 413 S.W.2d 74,
77 (Ky. 1967).
433 S.W.2d at 643.
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act does not involve the ultimate function of government, the
city should be required to respond in damages. 90
What did all of this mean? The last two quoted sentences
are especially puzzling. They suggest that a negligent act falling
on the individual citizen should be actionable so long as it does
not implicate an "ultimate function" of government. But were
not all "non-ultimate" functions open to liability anyway? Or
was the Court really just trying to draw a line between torts for
which the taxpayers could afford to pay and those for which
they could not-what might be called an "expensive tort" test?
Applying its new rationale to the facts before it,91 the Court at
least left the impression that cities would remain liable for losses
falling on the "isolated citizen," even if the neglience in issue
arose from an "ultimate function" such as police and fire pro-
tection.
92
Louisville Seed probably furnishes the best example of ju-
dicial inadequacy at a legislative task. The Court's legislative
instincts were sound, just as its brief dissertation on the hazards
of unlimited liability for local governments was entirely con-
vincing. True, "catastrophic liabilities from many suits might
dissuade the public officials from engaging in beneficial func-
tions to the general detriment of the public." 93 True, "there may
be losses so great in numbers and size that they could consume
the entire financial resources of even the largest municipality.
' 94
True, in many areas of risk "the citizen can more readily insure
against the loss on an individual basis than can the community
as a whole." 95 The only solution to such a multifaceted problem
was-and is-a multifaceted statute specifically immunizing serv-
ices that cities might prove unwilling or unable to provide in the
Id. (emphasis added).
In immunizing the city, the Court emphasized that the victims' losses were part
of a general catastrophe. "The effects of the failure were felt by a broad segment of
the public alike. And, as the city did not single out or deal with the appellee herein on
an individual basis, nor was its loss isolated from the loss occasioned by the general
public, we are of the opinion that judgment shall be reversed." Id. at 643-44 (footnote
omitted).
2 See id.





face of potential liability and eliminating the possibility of a
"crushing burden" through a limitation on damages.
The Court could not realistically undertake such a task,
however. Although it already was legislating up to a point, it
could not plausibly create by judicial fiat, for example, a dollar
limit on single injuries. It could only wade into the usual process
of drawing conceptual lines, the true dimensions of which must
be sharpened ad hoc through endless litigation. Thus, the Court
fashioned its "ultimate function" text with its enigmatic "indi-
vidual basis" corollary. The result was seventeen years of utter
confusion. The only thing predictable about the Court's deci-
sions over this period was the exculpation of the defendant
municipality.
96
In City of Russellville v. Greer,97 for example, the Court
nominally invoked its still recent Louisville Seed decision even
while embarking on an entirely different track. 93 The plaintiff
complained that he had suffered injuries in an automobile ac-
cident arising from the city's negligent failure to erect a stop
sign at a dangerous intersection. The Court could have re-
sponded that the city's decision not to erect a particular stop
sign was a "legislative" act (per Haney) or implicated a policy-
making process that is an "ultimate function" of government
(per Louisville Seed). Under either theory, the Court plausibly
could have immunized the city government and resolved the
issue before it without storming into a question that was not
before it-whether a city is liable for negligent maintenance of
an existing sign. 99 Instead, the Court declared flatly that "[t]he
regulation of traffic is a function of government, initiated and
implemented for the protection of the general public.... But a
municipality owes no legal duty to individual members of the
public to fully perform that function."'0
This line of reasoning culminated in Frankfort Variety, Inc.
v. City of Frankfort,10° in which the Court decided that a city
See text accompanying notes 97-139 infra.
" 440 S.W.2d 269 (Ky. 1968).
See id. at 270-71.
See id. at 270.
Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
'° 552 S.W.2d 653 (Ky. 1977).
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was not liable for the negligence of its fire department in insuf-
ficiently extinguishing a fire. The plaintiffs insisted that Louis-
ville Seed had granted them a cause of action because, unlike
the flood victims who had brought that suit, they were the
victims of an inadequate firefighting effort that affected only
their property.10 2 Confronting the "isolated citizens" that it had
conjured in Louisville Seed, 03 the Court blithely noted that the
city had not dealt with the fire victims on an individual basis-
"as a matter of law"-because firefighting is an ultimate func-
tion of government.'l 4 Then, by an act of judicial magic, the
Court made municipal immunity disappear even while it ensured
that municipalities would rarely, if ever, have to account for
their negligence. Nonliability of the city did not really flow from
the doctrine of governmental immunity, the Court now was
convinced. "Being engaged in a municipal function which affects
all members of the general public, the city owed no duty to
appellants; consequently, there was no negligence on which lia-
bility could be predicated."'' 05
With Frankfort Variety, the judicial effort to solve the im-
munity problem degenerated into wordplay: municipalities were
liable for their torts, because they were not immune; they were
"nonliable," however, because they had no duty for functions
affecting all members of the public. Frankfort Variety not only
restored municipal immunity-or "nonliability"-to an extent
unknown prior to Haney, but also replaced the legitimate con-
cerns expressed in Louisville Seed with the dubious proposition
that a city has no duty to exercise ordinary care for the protec-
tion of the general public.16 After Frankfort Variety, it became
,0' Id. at 655-56.
"" The Court had confronted them before. City of Lexington v. Yank, 431 S.W.2d
892, 894 (Ky. 1968), decided three months after Louisville Seed, involved allegations of
assault against a police officer. The Court found that the officer "substantially separated
Yank from the general public and dealt with him on an individual basis just as a private
person might have done." Id. In Fryar v. Stovall, 504 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Ky. 1973), the
Court relied upon Louisville Seed in holding a city liable for an accident resulting from
negligent direction of traffic by a city policeman. Compare these approaches to police
misconduct with the rationale offered by the Court in Frankfort Variety, 552 S.W.2d at
655.





difficult to imagine any municipal function, with the possible
exceptions of driving a car and owning property, that might be
actionable in tort.
Certainly the courts themselves could not come up with any.
A sorely perplexed Kentucky Court of Appeals applied Louisville
Seed (and pointedly ignored Frankfort Variety) in holding a
sewer district not answerable for the death of a child who had
drowned in a culvert of allegedly defective design. 0 7 Obediently
reasoning that provision of sewer services is an "ultimate func-
tion" of government, the court paused to observe that the higher
Court's innovative rule "seems quite close to the earlier distinc-
tion based on whether the activity was governmental or proprie-
tary."'' 0 8 In Brown v. City of Louisville,'" however, the same
court resorted to Frankfort Variety, concluding that a city could
not be liable for the negligence of its police who burned a tavern
by firing tear gas while quieting a disturbance. "[W]hen a city
provides police and fire protection ... the degree of success
that should or will be obtained in any particular instance cannot
be guaranteed," the court explained, "nor can it be defined in
terms of duties."" 0
The Kentucky Supreme Court returned to the fray in Grogan
v. Commonwealth,"' in which the plaintiffs had alleged the
negligence of city agents in conducting building and fire safety
inspections. Declaring that the applicable law had been "care-
fully considered, clearly enunciated, and firmly settled"' 1 2 in the
distinguished triumvirate of Louisville Seed, Greer, and Frank-
fort Variety, the Court unblushingly observed that "[t]hese prec-
edents do not restore the doctrine of sovereign immunity, nor
do they evince a retreat toward it.' ' 3 Nevertheless, the Court
experienced little difficulty in applying those precedents to ex-
onerate the city.' 4
10 Richmond v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 572
S.W.2d 601, 604 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
I° d.
585 S.W.2d 428 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
110 Id. at 430 (quoting 552 S.W.2d at 655).
... 577 S.W.2d 4 (Ky.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 835 (1979).
2 Id. at 5.
11 Id.
14 Id. at 6.
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Not until Commonwealth Department of Banking and Se-
curities v. Brown,"'5 however, did the Court elevate its clearly
enunciated and firmly settled principles to the pinnacle from
which they now govern the Commonwealth's Board of Claims.
While thus drastically expanding the importance of its municipal
liability decisions, the Court delegated to others the menial task
of deciphering those oracular messages. "We will not here in-
dulge in the niceties of academic analysis to define whether there
is duty upon the Commonwealth, the liability for which is shielded
by common law immunity, or whether no duty exists for actions
by the Commonwealth in its unique role," the Court announced.
"We leave such niceties to the academicians. 116 Having dis-
pensed with the niceties, the Court simply reiterated its "prag-
matic" conclusion that the Commonwealth, like its municipalities,
would have no common law liability "for the malfeasances of
its agents in the performance of obligations running to the public
as a whole.""
7
Such was the pragmatic state of the law when the Kentucky
Supreme Court once more put its hand to the plow in Gas
Service.
II. GAS SERVICE AND THE EXCEPTION FOR
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE AND QuASI-JUDICIAL ACTS
A. The Problem With Gas Service
In Gas Service Co. v. City of London,"' the Kentucky
Supreme Court finally and frankly conceded that its opinions
since Haney"9 had compromised the holding of that decision
"with new language raising up the municipal immunity concept
like Phoenix from the ashes, language which is at least as dif-
ficult to understand and apply as the old, discarded proprietary/
governmental dichotomy."' 20 The Court also took the important
step of abandoning the discreditable notion of Frankfort Variety,
"' 605 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1980).
" Id. at 499-500.
"I Id. at 500.
687 S.W.2d 144 (Ky. 1985).
386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964).
,z 687 S.W.2d at 147.
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Inc. v. City of Frankfort'2' that municipalities cannot be negli-
gent because they have no duty. "[O]n occasion we excuse the
nonperformance of this duty," the Court recognized, "but no
purpose is served by denying its existence."'
The Court followed this laudable and long-awaited house-
cleaning, however, with a new (or at least renewed) experiment
in linedrawing. As if to restore the heady optimism of Haney in
an unadulterated form, the Court preserved the exception for
legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, and quasi-judicial functions
that was adopted in Haney and subsequently ignored by what
can only loosely be described as Haney's progeny. 23 In itself,
the exception is unobjectionable. In fact, for reasons discussed
later in this section, an exception for any type of legislative or
judicial activity is not only historically and theoretically sound,
but also is infinitely superior to its nearest counterpart, the
"discretionary act" exception that has plagued the federal courts
and those of several states for decades.
The potential for a replay of the post-Haney debacle lies not
in the fortunately conceived exception preserved by the Court,
but in the examples selected by the Gas Service Court to elab-
orate that exception. The Court pointed to Grogan v. Common-
wealth,'24 the decision involving negligent enforcement of fire
safety regulations, and none other than Commonwealth Depart-
ment of Banking and Securities v. Brown, 12 which protected
the state from a suit alleging a negligent inspection of building
and loan associations. According to the Court, these cases are
practical illustrations of "regulatory functions which have ele-
ments appearing quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative in nature.' 26
Any hope that the legislative/judicial concept would remain a
narrow exception to a broad new rule of liability quickly evap-
orated with these words.
First, the "regulatory function" that formed the center of
controversy in Grogan and Banking and Securities has no quasi-
121 552 S.W.2d 653 (Ky. 1977).
,2 687 S.W.2d at 148.
"I Id. at 149.
,24 577 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. 1979).
M 605 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1980).
126 687 S.W.2d at 149.
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judicial or quasi-legislative aspects, or at least none ascertainable
from the facts recited in those decisions. Those facts admittedly
are slender, but it does not appear that the plaintiffs in those
cases were alleging any failure to make policy or promulgate
regulations, or even any misinterpretation of such policies or
regulations. Rather, the plaintiffs alleged a negligent failure to
enforce and follow regulations already in existence and, as all
the facts given in those decisions show, quite clear in their
directives. In Grogan, the city allegedly "failed to enforce laws
and regulations, including its own, establishing safety standards
for construction and use of buildings .... ,,127 In Banking and
Securities, the Board of Claims, two intermediate courts, and
the Kentucky Supreme Court itself "found the examiners of the
Department of Banking and Securities were derelict in not as-
certaining and reporting the true condition of the records of the
Associations.1' In both cases, the conduct attacked was noth-
ing more than the bungling of an established duty; nothing
remotely resembing a legislative or judicial act occurred.
The Court's choice of language in Gas Service immediately
immunizes negligent governmental inspections even though such
misconduct exhibits no features plausibly construed as judicial
or legislative. Establishment of safety rules undoubtedly is quasi-
legislative;' 29 application and interpretation of such rules by an
administrative officer at a hearing would qualify, under certain
circumstances, as quasi-judicial. 30 Even a failure to inspect might
earn the quasi-legislative distinction if it arose from a govern-
mental decision' to limit the scope of inspections because of
limitations on personnel or other resources. This is quite differ-
ent, however, from the Court's implicit suggestion 'that an or-
dinary inspection undertaken and botched by an official is an
immune act simply because inspections are "regulatory." ''
Describing the negligent inspections of Grogan and Banking
and Securities as quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial promises to
spread much disorder amid future efforts to understand the
' ' 577 S.W.2d at 5.
605 S.W.2d at 498.
,z See text accompanying notes 88-98 infra.
"- See text accompanying notes 99-102 infra.
See 687 S.W.2d at 149-50.
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meaning of those terms. If the courts are going to immunize a
negligent building inspector, why not exempt a negligent truck
driver as well? Both inflict harm through errors in judgment.
Are all erroneous judgments by governmental officials "quasi-
judicial," and, if so, what is likely to remain of municipal
liability? The only answer derivable from Gas Service is that it
is the "regulatory function," and not the exercise of judgment,
that confers immunity. Given the Court's gloss on the term
"regulatory function," however, this answer only spawns more
troublesome questions.
Grogan and Banking and Securities, the Court explained in
Gas Service, were cases in which the government assumed a
regulatory function "which is different from any performed by
private persons or in private industry, and where, if it were held
liable for falling to perform that function, it would be a new
kind of tort liability.' ' 3 2 The potential of this single phrase for
wrecking the Court's good intentions in Gas Service can hardly
be overestimated. This is not a description of legislative, judicial,
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial acts. This is our old friend City
of Louisville v. Louisville Seed Co.; 31 it is a resurrection of the
"ultimate governmental function" test, which, having been freshly
interred by the Court in the early pages of Gas Service, by the
last pages is seen wiping the dirt from its hands as it walks from
the grave. The Court's phrase arguably immunizes from tort
" Id. at 149.
,3 433 S.W.2d 638 (Ky. 1968). Consider the Court's remarks in fashioning the
"ultimate function" test of Louisville Seed:
Public agencies engage in activities of a scope and variety far beyond that
of any private business. These activities affect a much larger segment of
the public than do the activities of private business. Private business carries
on no activity even remotely comparable to a city street system which may
cover many thousands of miles and is used by the entire public. With rare
exceptions, private business carries on no function as hazardous or exacting
in detail as the work of a city fire or police department. These activities
are so inherently dangerous that private business would hesitate to under-
take them. In addition, our cities and other sovereign governments must
care for mental patients, keep jails, juvenile, and other detention services,
control the spread of communicable disease, maintain sewers and flood
facilities, and more recently, provide for control of riots.
Id. at 641 (footnote omitted). No capable advocate will ignore these words in arguing
that Gas Service preserves immunity for all of these "non-private" services, which,
taken together and extended by analogy, embrace the majority of municipal functions.
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liability every governmental function that has no counterpart in
private industry, an all too familiar "exception" that has been
generating uncertainty since the days of the "governmental/
proprietary" distinction.
3 4
Surely this was not the Court's intention. Still, words are
the lawyer's tools, and the tools for dismantling the new rule of
municipal liability are conveniently racked in the final para-
graphs of Gas Service. 35 One need not be much of a gambler
to predict that city attorneys and (thanks to the aberrational
Banking and Securities decision) the Kentucky Attorney General
himself will soon vigorously insist that the conduct challenged
by the injured citizen is immune because it arises from an activity
that is "regulatory," which is to say that it is "different from
any performed by private persons or private industry.' 3 6 It is,
in short, an ultimate governmental function.
37
This self-contradictory finale of Gas Service is especially
unfortunate since the Court's retention of the exception first
announced in Haney otherwise offers Kentucky's courts the
unique opportunity to fashion what is probably the only defen-
sible and practical judicial exception to a broad rule of govern-
mental liability. Because Kentucky's courts never developed the
exception after Haney, the Court was unable to find in Kentucky
law any useful exploration of those terms. Instead of resorting
The "governmental/proprietary" distinction was, in fact, little more than a
distinction between "public" and "private" characteristics of government. Consider the
following language from Lampton & Burks v. Wood, 250 S.W. 980 (Ky. 1923):
A municipality, in the exercise of certain of its corporate powers, does not
perform governmental functions because such powers are exercised by it
for the benefit of the public generally, and in their exercise it represents
and is an arm of the state. For instance, in matters pertaining to the public
health and to the maintenance of charitable, penal, reformatory, and
similar public institutions it acts in its public capacity because the public
generally is vitally interested in such activities. But when the municipality
exercises only such powers and privileges as are peculiarly for its own
benefit or the benefit of its own citizens or those of this immediate locality,
it is acting in its private or strictly corporate capacity, as distinguished
from its capacity as an arm of, and part of, the state.
Id. at 981 (emphasis added).
"I See 687 S.W.2d at 152-53 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
See id.
"' For a discussion of the ultimate governmental function test, see the text accom-
panying notes 46-50 supra.
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to the inapplicable situations of Grogan and Banking and Se-
curities, however, the Court could have looked to the experience
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in fleshing out the judicial/
legislative exception. After all, the Haney Court drew the excep-
tion from a Wisconsin decision, Holytze v. City of Milwaukee.3s
Unlike Kentucky, Wisconsin never discarded the exception. 39
If the Kentucky General Assembly chooses to ignore the
problem of municipal immunity for another twenty years, Ken-
tucky's courts will have to develop a workable interpretation of
the legislative/judicial exception. For this reason alone, lawyers
and judges facing issues of local governmental immunity can
profit from a study of the Wisconsin experience. Just as impor-
tantly, Wisconsin's helpful but flawed experiment with the ex-
ception offers a convenient starting point for examining a subject
that the General Assembly must confront if it decides to act-
whether to include a general exception for the "discretionary
acts" of governmental officials.
B. The Wisconsin Experience With Legislative/Judicial
Immunity
1. Three Cases
In Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 40 the plaintiff complained
that a city fire inspector negligently overlooked defects in water
pipes serving an office building in which the plaintiff was a
tenant. The building burned when the fire department was un-
able to summon an adequate water supply from the defective
pipes. The city replied-what else?-that the functions of a
building inspector are quasi-judicial and thus immune.'
4'
In rejecting this contention, the court relied upon an earlier
decision that held that the removal of a police officer from duty
involved a quasi-judicial action. 42 In the earlier case, the court
had listed three characteristics of a quasi-judicial act: (1) the'
exercise of discretion by a public officer to file or not file
' 115 N.W.2d 618 (Wis. 1962).
'1 See text accompanying notes 140-164 infra.
140 247 N.W.2d 132 (Vis. 1976).
141 Id. at 136.
,41 See Solarno v. Racine, 214 N.W.2d 446, 449-50 (Wis. 1974).
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charges; (2) the requirement of a public hearing before a specially
designated board; and (3) the imposition by that board of an
appropriate penalty based upon the record of that hearing.'43
"When the procedures involved in a proceeding approach the
judicial requirements of notice and hearing, the exercise of dis-
cretion, and a decision on the record," the Coffey court con-
cluded, "then the action can be said to be quasi-judicial."'
44
Applying this reasoning to the function of a building inspec-
tor, the court inevitably found that a negligent inspection could
not qualify for the exemption.
The duty to inspect is statutorily imposed. There is no discre-
tion to inspect or not inspect. Violations exist or do not exist
according to the dictates of the regulations governing the in-
spection and not according to the discretion of the inspector.
As to the actual conducting of the inspection, no essentially
judicial procedures are accorded to the building owner. Only
when it is determined that violations do exist, might quasi-
judicial actions take place involving enforcement procedures.
But the actual inspection as is involved here does not involve
a quasi-judicial function.
45
Lifer v. Raymond 146 also addressed the issue of quasi-judicial
immunity. A state road test examiner approved the issuance of
a driver's license to an especially obese young woman despite a
statute requiring denial of driving privileges to any persons af-
flicted with a disability "such as to prevent him from exercising
reasonable control over a motor vehicle."' 47 The young woman
eventually wrecked her car, injuring a passenger who claimed
that the driver's obesity had caused her to lose control of the
vehicle. The passenger sued the state on the theory that the road
test examiner had negligently performed a strictly "ministerial"
function and thus deserved no quasi-judicial immunity.
48
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in this instance closed the
door. Posing the issue as "how fat is too fat?,' '1 49 the court
Id. at 448.
,, 247 N.W.2d at 136.
', Id. at 136-37.
259 N.W.2d 537 (Wis. 1977).
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 343.06(7) (West 1971).




noted that no rule or statute established any maximum weight
for drivers. 50 Thus, "[a]ny determination by a road test exam-
iner that by reason of excess poundage a particular applicant
was unable to exercise reasonable control over a motor vehicle
is entirely an exercise of judgment on his part.' ' 15 1 The court
also pointed out that state officials in Wisconsin are immune
from liability arising from their "discretionary acts," whereas
municipal officers, by statute, are exempt when acting in their
legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial capacities.
Since the state examiner's decision to issue the license was clearly
discretionary, he was immune. The court noted, however, that
the distinction between state officers and municipal officers was
not controlling. 52 "As applied, the terms 'quasi-judicial or quasi-
legislative' and 'discretionary' are synonomous and the two tests
result in the same findings.'
'5 3
Finally, in a factual progression from the bizarre to the
ghoulish, the Wisconsin Supreme Court confronted in Scarpaci
v. Milwaukee County5 4 a claim to quasi-judicial immunity by a
county medical examiner alleged to have ordered an unauthor-
ized autopsy and to have performed the autopsy negligently. The
court relied upon Coffey and Lifer in holding that the medical
examiner's decision whether to proceed with an autopsy was
based upon his or her "subjective evaluation of the facts and
the law.""' Consequently, it was quasi-judicial in nature.
Negligent performance of the autopsy, however, the court
held to be actionable. Although conducting an autopsy undoubt-
edly involves acts of discretion, the court reasoned that the
discretion "is medical, not governmental." 56 It then resorted to
a comment in the Restatement (Second) of Torts'57 to explain
the difference between governmental and nongovernmental dis-
cretion: "It is only when the conduct involves the determination
110 Id. at 541.
'" Id.
Id. at 541-42.
" d. at 542.
'4 292 N.W.2d 816 (Wis. 1980).
'" Id. at 826.
' Id. at 827.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 895B comment d, 895C comment
g, 895D comment d (1977)).
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of fundamental governmental policy and is essential to the re-
alization of that policy, and when it requires 'the exercise of
basic policy evaluation, judgment and expertise' that the im-
munity should have application."'' 8 Since various judgments
made during an autopsy certainly involve no "determination of
fundamental governmental policy," the plaintiffs' claim of neg-
ligent performance was not barred. l 9
2. A Criticism
Superficially, Coffey, Lifer, and Scarpaci make sense and
reach just results. On a closer inspection, however, they do not
offer reliable guidance to the proper scope of the quasi-legisla-
tive/judicial exception. The problem begins in Lifer, when the
court immunizes a road test examiner for his discretionary is-
suance of a license. Concededly, his action was discretionary;
but what became of the court's definition in Coffey of a quasi-
judicial proceeding as one "approach[ing] the traditional judicial
requirements of notice and hearing, the exercise of discretion,
and a decision on the record. . . ."?,60 The road test examiner's
exercise of judgment involved the application of law to fact, but
it otherwise carried none of the ordinary attributes of a judicial
proceeding. A truck driver's decision to reduce his speed from
fifty to forty miles per hour in response to a "slow curve" sign
also involves an application of law to fact, but few would suggest
that his skidding into another vehicle is an exempt quasi-judicial
act.
Similarly, the medical examiner's decision to order an au-
topsy in Scarpaci was discretionary, but not identifiably quasi-
judicial under the definition of Coffey. The defendant's decision
to order the autopsy was not the result of an inquest. 161 It was
just another local official making a decision in his office, home,
or car. Additionally, the court's explanation of the distinction
between governmental and nongovernmental discretion was not
very intelligible when held to the light of its prior decisions. 62
'~' Id. at 827.
'" Id. at 827-28.
247 N.W.2d at 136.
292 N.W.2d at 828.
See text accompanying notes 77-83 supra.
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Again, a medical examiner's discretionary acts during the per-
formance of an autopsy obviously implicate no "determination
of fundamental governmental policy" 63 but neither does a road
test examiner's evaluation of an applicant's corpulence. Such a
determination is, in fact, almost (quasi?) "medical."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's biggest misstep lay in equat-
ing the quasi-legislative/judicial exception with the "discretion-
ary acts" exception. 64 They are not, or at least should not be,
synonomous. They arise from different motives and describe
different types of activity. The former can be defined with some
precision; the latter is so broad that it is practically useless until
narrowed by "interpretation." Since the Kentucky judiciary has
preserved the more precise exception, it should adopt and rig-
orously maintain a definition of the exception that both recog-
nizes the limited purpose behind the exception and furnishes
reliable guidance to those who must apply it.
C. A Suggestion for Defining the Quasi-Legislative and Quasi-
Judicial Acts Exception
1. Quasi-Legislative Acts
A quasi-legislative act should be analogous in some way to
the activities of a legislature: the making of law or governmental
policy. Legislatures now entrust vast lawmaking responsibilities
to administrative officers and agencies at every level of govern-
ment, and "when the officer or agency issues regulations or
other general provisions having an effect similar to that of a
statute or ordinance, this may be called a quasi-legislative func-
tion." 65 The exemption of such acts from judicial scrutiny in a
tort suit arises from a concern for separation of powers. 66 It is
163 292 N.W.2d at 827.
See id. at 825-26.
65 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895B comment c (1979). The drafters of the
Restatement would immunize at both the state and local level "acts and omissions
constituting (a) the exercise of a judicial or legislative function, or (b) the exercise of an
administrative function involving the determination of fundamental governmental pol-
icy." Id. §§ 895B, 895C.
6M
[I]f the state legislature passes a statute that causes injury to a person, he
cannot for that reason sue the State in tort and recover damages. The
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thus a legitimate exercise of judicial restraint motivated by a
deference to, rather than encroachment on, coordinate branches
of government. Nevertheless, the exception need not, and should
not, extend beyond the essential governmental act of making
law or policy. Legislative and quasi-legislative acts merit judicial
deference and insulation from damage suits, but, the law having
been passed or the policy made, courts should hold the govern-
ment and its agents to the same standard of compliance as that
governing the private citizen.167
Admittedly, confining the exemption to policymaking will
not automatically resolve at its threshold every dispute over
immunity. In some cases, factual development will be necessary
to know whether the claimant's injury arose from the making
of a policy or faulty implementation of the policy. A useful
discussion of this process occurs in Stevenson v. State Depart-
courts respect the action of a coordinate branch of government. If the
statute should happen to be unconstitutional that can be determined in
other ways than a tort action against the state.
Id. § 895B comment c, at 402. McQuillan extends this rationale to the municipal level,
explaining:
[T]o accept a jury's verdict as to the reasonableness and safety of a plan
of governmental services and prefer it over the judgment of the govern-
mental'body which originally considered and passed on the matter would
be to obstruct normal governmental operations and to place in inexpert
hands what the governmental body has seen fit to entrust to experts.
18 E. MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.04(a), at 158 (3d ed.
1984) (footnote omitted). Note, however, that McQuillan discusses the immunization of
government "planning," which is a broader term than "policymaking." McQuillan relies
upon Weiss v. Fote, 167 N.E.2d 63 (N.Y. 1960), for the above quotation. The Weiss
court immunized as a "planning function" a city's alleged negligence in providing too
brief a clearance interval for a traffic light at a busy intersection. Compare this result
with Stevenson v. State Dep't of Transp., 619 P.2d 247 (Or. 1980), discussed in the text
accompanying notes 91-96 infra.
For judicial discussions of separation of powers as the basis for exempting "dis-
cretionary" acts, see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 648-49, reh'g denied,
446 U.S. 993 (1980); Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352, 362 n.8 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).
"' The most dogged advocate of confining immunity to policymaking has been
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis. Davis has long criticized the "discretionary functions"
exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976), as a bottomless
pit and suggests that Congress amend the statute to protect the government from liability
on claims "based upon a determination of law or governmental policy by a federal
agency or an employee of government." 5 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §
27:45, at 247 (2d ed. 1984). See also his analysis of the reasons underlying immunization
of policymaking functions, as distinguished from discretionary acts in general. Id. §
27:11.
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ment of Transportation,6 ' an Oregon Supreme Court decision.
The plaintiff alleged that the state had negligently designed a
traffic light system located at a busy highway intersection. The
intermediate appellate court reversed a judgment for the plain-
tiff, relying upon earlier decisions by the Oregon Supreme Court
holding that the state was not liable for defects in highways
resulting from "planning and design," but only for defects in
"maintenance." 16 9 Disowning this "mechanical or semantic ap-
proach," the Oregon Supreme Court explained that the inquiry
should focus not on whether the alleged mistake occurred during
the "planning and design" stage, but whether it involved the
exercise of "governmental discretion or policy judgment."' 
70
To exemplify its new approach, the court discussed cases in
which the negligence alleged was the failure of highway author-
ities to install a cattle guard at a particular entrance to a con-
trolled-access freeway 171 or a failure to design and construct a
portion of highway so as to prevent vehicles from crossing into
an oncoming lane.
72
If the responsible officials had determined, for example, that
their budgets would not permit them to provide all desirable
safety features and that the public would be better served by
facilities other than cattle guards or median barriers, that
would constitute the immune exercise of governmental discre-
tion. If, on the other hand, they had decided to install cattle
guards or median barriers wherever certain kinds of conditions
existed and the failure to install them in a particular location
was the result of a failure to determine that those conditions
did in fact exist at that location, no exercise of judgment about
governmental policy would be involved.'7
Turning to the case before it, the court held that the state had
not met its burden of showing that the defect in its traffic control
619 P.2d 247 (Or. 1980).
119 Stevenson v. State of Oregon, 601 P.2d 854, 857-58 (Or. 1979), rev'd, 619 P.2d
247 (Or. 1980).
"1 619 P.2d at 249, 251. The court was interpreting the "discretionary function"
exception of the Oregon Tort Claims Act, OR. REv. STAT. § 30.265(3) (1981), modeled
on the comparable provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
'" See State v. Webster, 504 P.2d 1316 (Nev. 1972).
See Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977).
619 P.2d at 254.
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system resulted from a determination of governmental policy
instead of a mistake in engineering judgment. 4
When applied to the circumstances in Grogan and Banking
and Securities, this construction of the "quasi-legislative" excep-
tion would result in the "denial of immunity. The government
failed in those cases to show that the derelict inspections chal-
lenged by the plaintiffs arose from a considered allocation of
scarce resources or any other decision on governmental policy.
75
The responsible agency had already expressed its policy by im-
posing a duty to inspect, and the responsible agents had failed
to perform that duty. More ambiguous circumstances are pre-
sented by cases such as Louisville Seed and Greer. 76 Was the
municipality's failure to install flood gates or to erect a stop
sign the result of a decision on governmental policy or merely
of footdragging or poor engineering? The facts given in those
decisions do not answer the question, because the court never
asked it.
2. Quasi-Judicial Acts
A quasi-judicial act is more easily identifiable than a quasi-
legislative act. In determining whether a certain action is quasi-
legislative, the court must discriminate between types of discre-
tionary acts that may result from the same process. A city
council meeting may produce an immune decision to restrict the
number of automatic traffic signals because of scarce resources;
the same meeting may result in a negligent and nonexempt failure
to order the erection of a signal clearly required by existing city
policy. With quasi-judicial acts, by contrast, the trappings of
the process itself are the key to the exception. 177
174
The State has argued that there is immunity in this case because the
arrangement of the traffic lights and the design of their shielding were
appropriate matters for engineering judgment. It may be conceded that
this is so, but there is nothing in the record to suggest that the responsible
employees of the highway division made any policy decision of the kind
we have described as the exercise of governmental discretion.
Id.
"' See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
See text accompanying notes 46-52 supra.
'" See text accompanying notes 85-88 supra.
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An exemption for quasi-judicial acts is but an extension of
the long-established rule of judicial immunity.' 78 In part, the
exemption stems from a societal desire that all participants in
the judicial process-judges, prosecutors, witnesses-pursue their
necessary duties vigorously without fear of retribution.' 79 This
alone, however, is not enough to justify absolute immunity.
Society desires that all of its officials pursue their duties consci-
entiously, but it cannot always afford to subsidize vigor by
ignoring irresponsibility.
Absolute immunity is justified, however, because the judicial
process contains certain checks on an individual official's dis-
cretion. The formalities of legal process make the occurrence of
arbitrary and egregious errors less likely, and the conferral of
immunity thereby becomes more affordable. Relying upon this
rationale, the United States Supreme Court extended judicial
immunity from suit under the civil rights laws to federal admin-
istrative hearing examiners:
The insulation of the judge from political influence, the im-
portance of precedent in resolving controversies, the adversary
nature of the process, and the correctability of error in appeal
are just a few of the many checks on malicious action by
judges. Advocates are restrained not only by their professional
obligations, but by the knowledge that their assertion will be
contested by their adversaries in open court. Jurors are care-
fully screened to remove all possibility of bias. Witnesses are,
of course, subject to the rigors of cross-examination and the
penalty of perjury. Because these features of the judicial proc-
ess tend to enhance the reliability of information and the
impartiality of the decision-making process, there is a less
pressing need for individual suits to correct constitutional er-
ror. 180
'1 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23 (1976) ("The common-law im-
munity of a prosecutor is based upon the same considerations that underlie the common-
law immunities of judges.").
,79 For a comprehensive examination of the subject, see Imbler, id., in which the
United States Supreme Court extended absolute immunity to prosecutors. See also
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (immunizing state judges sued on constitutional
claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981)).
" Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978). The Court found that "adjudi-
cation within a federal administrative agency shares enough of the characteristics of the
judicial process that those who participate in such adjudication should also be immune
from suits for damages." Id. at 512-13.
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This is also the logic that guided the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Coffey but escaped it in Lifer and Scarpaci.'8' Kentucky
courts should not make the same mistake. The courts should
limit the exception for quasi-judicial acts to those activities that
are truly analogous to a judicial proceeding-those exhibiting
the fundamental attributes of notice, a hearing, and a decision
based upon the record.'
3 2
D. After Gas Service
If experience is our guide, Kentucky's courts may well have
to proceed without legislative assistance' 83 and develop the ex-
ception for quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial acts established
by Haney and preserved by Gas Service. If so, the courts should
limit the exception to serve two established judicial principles:
reluctance to intrude upon the formation of governmental policy'8
and respect for the self-corrective attributes of the judicial proc-
ess.'18 Should the courts proceed down the path perhaps inad-
vertently mapped by Gas Service, immunizing every "regulatory
191 See text accompanying notes 77-86 supra.
"' Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1967), is instructive on this
point. The Florida Supreme Court had preserved an exception for quasi-judicial and
quasi-legislative functions in its groundbreaking decision of Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1957). See text accompanying note 40 supra. Ten years
later, the court considered in Modlin a claim to quasi-judicial immunity by a city whose
building inspector had negligently inspected an overhead mezzanine that later collapsed.
In defining "quasi-judicial," the court drew from standards governing the availability
of common law certiorari for review of administrative "quasi-judicial" acts.
If the affected party is entitled by law to the essentially judicial procedures
of notice and hearing, and to have the action taken based upon the showing
made at the hearing, the activity is judicial in nature. If such activity occurs
other than in a court of law, we refer to it as quasi-judicial.
201 So. 2d at 74.
It is interesting that the court denied the inspector quasi-judicial immunity upon
these grounds, but immunized his negligence on other familiar grounds. "At the time
he allegedly negligently performed the inspection," the Florida Supreme Court con-
cluded, "he owed no duty to Mrs. Modlin in any way different from that owed to any
other member of the public." Id. at 76. The Kentucky Supreme Court cited Modlin in
Grogan v. Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 4, 5-6 (Ky.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 835 (1979),
its decision immunizing the city fire inspector.
"I See Gas Service, 687 S.W.2d at 151-52, where the Court expressed the hope that
the Kentucky General Assembly would resolve the issue.
' See note 89 supra.
'' See text accompanying note 100 supra.
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function" that is "different from any performed by private
persons or in private industry."' 8 6 they inevitably will subvert
the Kentucky Supreme Court's intention to restore municipal
liability as the rule rather than the exception.' 87 Just as probable,
they will emerge from this theoretical thicket twenty years from
now oppressed by the need to restore Haney yet again.
The courts can safeguard their jurisprudential interests, but
only the Kentucky General Assembly can address satisfactorily
the fiscal concerns persuasively stated in Louisville Seed. Short
of gradually restoring virtually absolute immunity as they did in
the post-Haney era, the courts cannot protect local governments
from the potentially crushing burden of unlimited tort judg-
ments. Whatever course the courts may chart in the wake of
Gas Service, the need for a comprehensive legislative solution
will remain.
III. TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE
GOVERNMENTAL LIABILTY STATUTE
A. A Constitutional Question
Any legislation limiting recoverable damages in Kentucky
inevitably encounters sections fourteen and fifty-four of the state
constitution. Section fourteen guarantees that "every person for
an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law. . ."I" Section fifty-
four provides that the Kentucky General Assembly "shall have
no power to limit the amount to be recovered for injuries re-
sulting in death, or for injuries to person or property.' ' 9 These
clauses preclude the General Assembly from abolishing or di-
minishing any such right of action that existed when the present
constitution was adopted in 1891.' 90
' 687 S.W.2d at 149.
'" See id. at 157.
KY. CONST. § 14.
'' Id. at § 54.
Carney v. Moody, 646 S.W.2d 40, 40 (Ky. 1982). Section 241 of the Kentucky
Constitution also prohibits the legislature from denying a right of action for wrongful
death. See Britton's Adm'r. v. Samuels, 136 S.W. 143 (Ky. 1911).
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Section 231 is the ready answer to these obstacles at the state
and county levels.' 91 The Board of Claims Act already has sur-
vived a constitutional challenge under section fourteen. In Rooks
v. University of Louisville, 92 the court explained that other
constitutional sections do not "impinge on the right of the
Commonwealth by its General Assembly under Section 231 to
direct in what manner and in what court suit may be brought
against it."' 93 The same reasoning would counter any objection
under section fifty-four. 94 Since counties and their boards of
education also derive their immunity as political subdivisions of
the state from section 231, at least pending any judicial tamp-
ering with the holding in Cullinan v. Jefferson County,195 there
is no basis for objection to a statute regulating claims against
them.
The constitutional situation of municipal corporations is more
problematical. There is precedent for the proposition that "since
the right to sue a municipal corporation for tortious acts may
be conferred or withheld at the pleasure of the Legislature, the
latter may attach such conditions to the right to recover as it
deems proper or expedient."'' 9 The Kentucky judiciary's habit
of revamping municipal liability law every few years, however,
rests uneasily beside its practice of viewing state and county
liability as legislative preserves under section 231. If the Ken-
tucky General Assembly alone can waive constitutional immu-
nity, then judicial tinkering with municipal immunity suggests
that section 231 does not extend to the municipal level. If section
231 does not apply to municipalities, the question arises whether
the General Assembly has the power, in the face of sections
,1 See notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of § 231.
W2 574 S.W.2d 923 (Ky. Ct. App., 1978).
I Id. at 925 (quoting Wood v. Board of Educ., 412 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Ky. 1967)).
As the court further explained, "it is a basic rule of construction that the Constitution
be interpreted whenever possible so as to harmonize various provisions. The present case
offers just such a construction opportunity, and so it would seem that sovereign immunity
does not contradict other parts of the state Constitution." Id.
'-" See Commonwealth v. Daniel, 98 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1936) (upholding against a
challenge under § 54 a statute limiting damages recoverable from the state's Department
of Highways).
' ' 418 S.W.2d 407 (Ky. 1967). See notes 53-60 supra and accompanying text.
Galloway v. City of Winchester, 184 S.W.2d 890, 891 (Ky. 1944).
1985-86]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL [Vol. 74
fourteen and fifty-four, to restrict by statute damage suits against
municipal corporations.
Justice Palmore pointed out in his dissent to Cullinan that
the plain wording of section 231 does not support its extension
to suits against counties and other local governments "in which
no recovery would or could constitute a claim upon the state
treasury.' ' 97 He could have observed that the plain language of
section 231 does not require prohibition of suits at any level of
government. Section 231 is a provision of enablement; the Gen-
eral Assembly "may"-that is, it is empowered to-direct the
manner of bringing suit against the Commonwealth. As Justice
Palmore's logic suggests, the provision was designed to give the
legislature clear authority for regulating demands upon public
funds.
Accepting this as the purpose of section 231, it makes little
sense to discriminate among state, county, and municipal trea-
suries. The state has delegated the taxing power to subordinate
political organizations, enabling them to offer services that the
state might otherwise have to fund. 98 Thus, the tax pool-the
"common wealth"-derives from a single source, and subjecting
'9' Id. at 411 (Palmore, J., dissenting).
" Section 181 of the Kentucky Constitution empowers the Kentucky General
Assembly to confer the taxing power on political subdivisions, and the General Assembly
has exercised this power in KRS §§ 92.280, 92.281 (cities), 67.083 (counties), and 67A.060
(urban-county governments). See KRS §§ 92.80, 92.281, 67.083, 67A.60 (Bobbs-Merrill
1980). The Court explained this essential unity of the taxing power in Commonwealth
v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 80 S.W. 158, 161 (Ky. 1904):
Taxes levied by counties, cities, towns, and taxing districts are imposed by
authority of the state. Counties are but subdivisions of the state, created
for governmental purposes. They derive their authority from the state, and
can levy no taxes except such as the state authorizes them to levy. They
levy taxes by authority of the state, and the levies they make are as fully
the act of the state as those made by the Legislature itself. The only
difference is that the Legislature, under the power vested in it, instead of
levying these taxes itself, authorizes local legislative bodies better adapted
to understand the local necessities to make the levies as the local exigencies
require. This power of the Legislature, which is universally exercised, is
recognized in section 157, 158, 159 and 180 of the Constitution, and is in
words conferred on the Legislature by section 181.... Unquestionably,
the state, in the distribution of the powers of the government, may commit
to one body the power to levy certain taxes, and to another, the power to
levy others; but when it does this all the taxes so levied are levied by the
authority of the state.
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any portion of it to destruction by damage claims can only shift
the political burden to another portion. Looking to the function
of section 231, then, it is nonsensical, at least in the absence of
any legislative history to the contrary, to suppose that the Ken-
tucky General Assembly has the authority to prevent the emp-
tying of state and county chests but is powerless to interfere in
the financial ruin of municipal corporations. Reversing Justice
Palmore's logic and adapting it to the conclusion reached by the
majority in Cullinan, there is no legal or semantic basis for not
extending section 231 to authorize legislative protection for mu-
nicipal, as well as county and state, tax dollars.
The danger, then, in a judicial rethinking of Cullinan-the
"larger question" reserved by the present Court's majority in
Dunlap'99-is not the abolition of immunity for counties. It is
the likelihood that restricting application of section 231 to claims
upon the "state treasury" will undermine section 231 as a source
of authority for legislative control over claims upon all other
repositories of tax dollars. The long neglected but still promising
power of the General Assembly to find a middle ground between
the "crushing burden" of unchecked liability and the inequities
of blanket immunity would suffer a serious reversal. Should the
Kentucky Supreme Court undertake a review of the plain text
of section 231, it should consider the proposition that section
231 does not require any kind of immunity, but confers power
on the General Assembly to regulate claims upon state and state-
sanctioned tax revenues.
Finally, there is a less theoretical answer to any fear that
sections fourteen and fifty-four stand in the way of a statute
regulating municipal liability: there were very few circumstances
in 1891200 in which a person might sue a municipal corporation,
so there are very few "rights of action" that a governmental
liability statute would abolish or diminish. Cities already enjoyed
immunity from liability for their failure to exercise "governmen-
tal power."201 The few decisions memorializing successful suits
against municipalities prior to 1891 generally arise from the duty
' See notes 58-60 supra and accompanying text.
: The current Kentucky Constitution was adopted in 1891.
2 See, e.g., James' Adm'r v. Harrodsburg, 3 S.W. 135 (Ky. 1887).
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to keep streets and sidewalks in ordinary repair. 20 2 Kentucky's
courts have exercised caution in applying sections fourteen and
fifty-four to overturn legislation and have upheld statutory re-
strictions on rights of action absent a convincing demonstration
that the restriction infringed a right of action available in 1891.203
For this reason alone, sections fourteen and fifty-four should
offer little hindrance to a governmental liability statute, which
will create rather than destroy or diminish legal remedies.
B. Implications of Federal Civil Rights Statutes
However the state may insulate its political organizations
from liability under state law, state governments remain suscep-
tible to damage suits in federal court for infractions of the
United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Monell v. New York City Department of
Social Services2°4 opened the door to civil rights suits against
cities, and the Court since has denied to cities even a qualified
immunity based upon the good faith of city officials. 25 In an
even more striking development, the United States Supreme Court
recently decided that a judgment under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871206 against a public officer in his "official
capacity" imposes liability upon the governmental entity that he
represents. Thus, local governments are now directly liable in
202 See, e.g., City of Newport v. Miller, 12 Ky. 422 (Ky. 1890); Trustees v. Wagers,
9 Ky. 51 (Ky. 1887).
101 See, e.g., 646 S.W.2d 40 (upholding KRS § 413.135 (1972)); Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co. v. Gov't Employee Ins. Co., 635 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1982) (upholding KRS §
304.39-070(3), .39-070(4), and .39-140(3) (1981)).
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
2 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (The Court stated that
"there is no tradition of immunity for municipal corporations.").
206 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a codification from the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979). See generally Comment, Police Misconduct: Municipal
Liability Under Section 1983, 74 Ky. L.J. 651 (1985-86).
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federal court for the constitutional torts of their employees. 20 7
While drastically expanding the vulnerability of local govern-
ments under the civil rights laws, the United States Supreme
Court nevertheless has narrowed the scope of section 1983 and
shifted much of the litigation arising from the acts of state
officers back into state court. In Parratt v. Taylor,20 8 the Court
held that a prison inmate could not sue state officials under
section 1983 for violation of his right to due process where state
tort law provided him with adequate post-deprivation remedies.
The Court was careful to note that state remedies are not in-
adequate to satisfy the requisites of due process just because
they do not provide a claimant with all of the relief available
under section 1983 .209 The lower federal courts have divided on
the boundaries of Parratt. Some have confined the decision
strictly to deprivations of property, 210 while others, including the
Sixth Circuit, have interpreted the rationale of Parratt to include
deprivations of liberty as well. 21' The most persuasive opinions
have limited Parratt not on the basis of the type of interest
asserted but on whether the alleged deprivation was substantive
Z 7 According to Justice Stevens in Brandon v. Holt, 105 S. Ct. 873 (1985), prior
decisions by the United States Supreme Court had "plainly implied" that a judgment
against a public servant in his official capacity imposes liability upon the entity that he
or she represents so long as it has notice and an opportunity to respond. "We now
make that point explicit," Justice Stevens wrote. Id. at 878.
The eleventh amendment continues to bar damage suits against states and state
officials in their official capacity. U. S. CONST. amend XI. State officials can be sued
in their "individual" capacity, but neither the judgment nor the attorneys fees authorized
by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981) are collectible from the state. See Kentucky v. Graham, 105
S. Ct. 3099 (1985).
2-- 451 U.S. 527 (1981), partially overruled, Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986).
In concluding that Parratt had not been deprived of property without due process because
the state provided him an adequate post-deprivation remedy, Justice Rehnquist pointed to
Nebraska's tort claims statute, NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-8209 (1976). 451 U.S. at 543.
The United States Supreme Court held in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.
Ct. 3194 (1984), that the Parratt rule extends to intentional as well as negligent acts by
state officials. More recently, the Court eliminated negligence altogether as a cognizable
constitutional claim under the Due Process Clause. U.S. at , 106 S. Ct. at 663.
21 451 U.S. at 544.
21" See, e.g., Vail v. Board of Educ., 706 F.2d 1435, 1440-41 (7th Cir. 1983), aff'd
per curiam by equally divided court, 466 U.S. 377 (1984).
2" See Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 584 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc). See also
Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom., Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983).
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or procedural.212 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court continues to
tinker with Parratt and recently overruled it to the extent that
it had held a claim for mere negligence to state a cause of action
under the Due Process Clause.
213
How the United States Supreme Court will resolve this con-
troversy is conjectural, and a lengthy examination of the subject
is well beyond the scope of this Article. 214 At a minimum,
however, state legislators should be mindful that the availability
of state remedies may determine whether an action for damages
against a local government or its agents winds up in federal
court or remains subject to state jurisdiction and state law. If
the state actor's conduct falls within the Parratt rule, absolute
immunization of that conduct under state law may actually
defeat the state's interest in controlling claims upon local trea-
suries.
An outstanding example of this tension between state gov-
ernmental immunity law and federal civil rights statutes is the
subject of police liability. Kentucky courts have immunized local
government from liability for negligent acts by policemen in the
performance of their duties, reasoning that cities should not
have to guarantee success in the provision of police protection.
215
At the same time, police officers and local governments have
remained subject to suit within the Sixth Circuit under the civil
112 See, e.g., Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1984); Augustine v.
Doe, 740 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1984); Begg v. Moffitt, 555 F. Supp. 1344 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
Construing Parratt in conjunction with Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422
(1982) (state Fair Employment Practices Commission's error allowing appellant's cause
of action to become extinguished was a deprivation of a property interest in violation
of the fourteenth amendment due process clause), these decisions interpret Parratt as
applicable to deprivations of liberty and property interests, but only when the plaintiff
is alleging a deprivation of procedural due process and the nature of the challenged
conduct is such that the provision of pre-deprivation procedural safeguards is impractic-
able. Deprivation of substantive due process remains actionable. The Sixth Circuit
adopted this reasoning in Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, but took the additional step
of concluding that only intentional conduct can constitute a violation of substantive due
process. Id. at 586.
213 106 S. Ct. at 665.
2,, For a discussion on this subject, see Friedman, Parratt v. Taylor: Opening and
Closing the Door on Section 1983, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 545 (1982).
215 See Brown v. City of Louisville, 585 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
[Vol. 74
1985-861 GOv NTAL LiLrrynn
rights laws for their negligent or intentional misconduct. 2 6 The
federal statutes, of course, place no ceiling on recoverable dam-
ages, permit punitive damages against private individuals, and
also authorize the award of attorney's fees to prevailing plain-
tiffs.217 Should the Kentucky General Assembly tackle the task
of framing a comprehensive governmental liability statute, it
should be wary of following the example of those states that
have chosen to immunize the action of police. 218 A limited but
constitutionally adequate state statutory remedy for the tortious
acts of policemen may compensate injured citizens while pre-
serving tax dollars much more effectively than a total exemption,
which can only funnel all claims against police officers into the
federal forum.
21 9
C. Components of a Governmental Liability Statute
A review of the governmental liability statutes of other states
quickly discloses the extent to which reasonable minds can differ
26 See, e.g., Dunn v. Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1086 (1983); Bruner v. Dunaway, 684 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1171 (1983); Taylor v. Canton, Ohio Police Dept., 544 F. Supp. 783 (N.D. Ohio
1982); Melson v. Kroger, 550 F. Supp. 1100 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
2,7 Punitive damages are not recoverable against municipalities, City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981), although individual defendants are subject
to them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a finding that the defendant's conduct was reckless
or callously indifferent to plaintiff's rights. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983).
Attorneys fees may be awarded to a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which
provides, in part: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981,
1982, 1983, 1985 and 1986 ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
2,s See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 36-33-3 (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 4-102
(Smith-Hurd 1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104 (1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §
155(6) (West Supp. 1984-85).
2I But at least one court has permitted police to enjoy both state-sanctioned
immunity and the benefits of Parraft. See Eberle v. Baumfalk, 524 F. Supp. 515 (N.D.
I1. 1981). This result may offer comfort to some, but the chances for widespread
acceptance of this illogical decision are poor. Compare Eberle with Loftin v. Thomas,
681 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1982), in which the court looked carefully to state remedial
statutes before dismissing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A petition for certiorari filed
on May 29, 1985, from an unpublished decision by the Fourth Circuit, Gillies v. Delozier,
758 F.2d 647 (4th Cir. 1985), asks whether the court of appeals erred in holding that a
meaningful state remedy was available to the claimant when the defendant official relied
upon sovereign immunity and the court of appeals could not guarantee that sovereign
immunity would not bar recovery in state court. See Gillies v. Delozier, 54 U.S.L.W.
3003 (U.S. July 2, 1985).
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on the proper scope of such a statute. Arkansas took the most
radically restrictive approach when, in the wake of a judicial
decision abolishing municipal immunity in 1969, 20 its legislature
declared an emergency and passed a statute immunizing counties,
municipal corporations, and all other political subdivisions of
the state. 22' At the other end of the spectrum is Alabama's brief
statute, which imposes on local governments the same liability
as that of a private person.m The statute contains no exemptions
for any type of governmental conduct, although it does place a
ceiling on damages. California weighs in with the most volumi-
nous statute,2 while Connecticut confines its idiosyncratic effort
to a single section of its code.
224
Somewhere between these extremes lie a variety of admirably
concise yet thorough efforts toward regulating the liability of
local governments.? The statutes vary on details, but contain
four essential attributes: (1) a ceiling on damages, usually in-
cluding a prohibition of punitive damages;2 6 (2) an enumeration
of certain governmental actions or services that remain im-
See Parish v. Pitts, 429 S.W.2d 45 (Ark. 1968).
22 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2901 (1979). The statute authorizes political subdivisions
to provide for hearing and settlement of tort claims and requires them to carry motor
vehicle liability insurance. Id. §§ 12-2901, 12-2902.
m ALA. CODE §§ 11-93-1 to 11-93-3 (1985). The limit is $100,000 for bodily injury
or death of one person in a single occurrence or for property damage arising from a
single occurrence, and $300,000 for claims by two or more persons for injury or death
from a single occurrence.
22 CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1980).
"4 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-465 (West Supp. 1985). The statute requires
municipalities to indemnify an employee for liabilities incurred for acts "in the perform-
ance of his duties and within the scope of his employment," so long as the act was not
willful or wanton. It is interesting that there is no limit on damages.
21 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (Vest Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-901
to 6-928 (1979 & Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-16.5-1 to 34-4-16.5-19 (Bums
Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-6101 to 75-6117 (1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
466.01-.15 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 23-2401 to 23-2420 (1932);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 151-62 (West 1984 & Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
29-20-101 to 29-20-407 (1980 & Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-1 to 63-30-34
(1953 & Supp. 1985).
Some states, instead of abolishing immunity generally and carving out exceptions,
have chosen to designate specific areas of liability amid general immunity. See, e.g., PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 8541-64 (Purdon 1982); Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-39-101 to 1-39-119
(Supp. 1985).
"I See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154 (West Supp. 1985).
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mune;2 7 (3) a provision for the defense and indemnification of
governmental employees acting in the scope of their employ-
ment;22 and (4) an authorization for, or requirement of, the
purchase of liability insurance by governmental units. 9 Because
of the wide leeway that exists within this framework for discus-
sion and selection of remedies, I will not undertake the task of
proposing a model act. A proposed statute, House Bill 120,
received the approval of the House in the last regular session of
the General Assembly, but failed to get out of a joint committee
on the final day of the session.230 The following is a brief
examination of the four basic attributes of a government liability
statute and a basic list of options drawn from the experience of
other jurisdictions for consideration by the General Assembly.
1. Limitations on Damages
A just damages ceiling lies at the heart of any statute ad-
dressing the "crushing burden" that tort claims might otherwise
place on governmental entities. The ceiling should be high enough
to compensate adequately a serious injury, and the $50,000
limit 2 ' currently enacted in Kentucky for claims against the state
and its employees is, to put it bluntly, unusually stingy. Several
states have limited claims to $100,000 for injuries arising from
single accidents or occurrences and greater amounts for any
2" See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104 (1984).
z' See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-903 (Supp. 1985).
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-403 (Supp. 1985).
_ H.R. 86 BR 354, 1986 Leg., Regular Sess. (1986), sponsored by Representative
Myers of Covington, Kentucky [reported out of committee and hereinafter referred to
as House Bill 120]. As originally drafted, House Bill 120 applied only to municipal
corporations. It suggested a limit of $300,000 per person, with the aggregate per accident
not to exceed $1,000,000, to be apportioned among all defendants. It prohibited punitive
damages, as well as damages for pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of consor-
tium, and loss of uncompensated services. It also provided for periodic payment of
judgments where necessary, and it suggested specific exemptions, including ones similar
to those listed in the text accompanying notes 156, 159, 160, 164 (riot only), 167, 168
infra. The bill ultimately was expanded to include county governments, but the provisions
establishing limits on damages were dropped.
-- KRS § 44.070(5) (1980). This ceiling is unusually, but not uniquely, low. See,
e.g., TEN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-403 (permits insurance coverage of $40,000 single injury,
S80,000 for two or more persons, more for auto accidents).
1985-86"]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL [Vol. 74
number of claims arising from a single accident or occurrenceY2
Others set the limit at $300,000 for single injuries, which is the
figure in the Kentucky proposal. 233 Many statutes establish lower
limits for property damage claims, which is an effective way of
reserving governmental revenues for the redress of more serious
personal injuries.
2 4
The Kentucky Supreme Court recently adopted comparative
fault, 2 5 and the Kentucky General Assembly should incorporate
this into any governmental liability statute. In fairness to the
injured claimant, the statutes should require the factfinder to
apportion actual damages before applying the limitation on re-
coverable damages. Thus, assuming the limit to be $300,000, a
claimant found to have suffered $400,000 in actual damages and
to have been fifty percent negligent would receive $200,000
rather than $150,000. The Kentucky Proposal follows this ap-
proach.2
3 6
The Kentucky General Assembly also must consider the na-
ture of the damages that are to be compensable. Most states
have prohibited governmental liability for punitive damages,
237
232 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(5) ($100,000 single injury limit, $200,000
aggregate); IDAHO CODE § 6-926 ($100,000 single limit, $300,000 aggregate); OIUA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 51, § 154 ($100,000 single limit, $1,000,000 aggregate); OR. REv. STAT. §
30.270 (1983) ($100,000 single limit, $300,000 aggregate); TEXAS REv. Crv. STAT. ANN.
art. 62-52 19(b) (Vernon Supp. 1985) ($100,000 single injury, $300,000 aggregate).
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 344-16.5-4 (Burns Supp. 1985) ($300,000 single
limit, $5,000,000 aggregate). The Kentucky Proposal suggests a $300,000 single person
limit and a $1,000,000 aggregate. See note 131 supra. North Dakota has set a $250,000
single injury limit, with a $500,000 aggregate for injuries to three or more persons. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03(2) (Supp. 1985). Utah uses the $250,000 single limit with the
$500,000 aggregate applying to injuries to two or more persons. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-
30-34.
'-" See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(A)(1) ($25,000 limit per claimant for
property damage from single occurrence); Tax. REv. CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19(b)(2)d(b)
($10,000 limit for single occurrence).
21 Hilen v. Hayes, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).
216 Section 3 of House Bill 120 provides that recoverable damages shall not exceed
the lesser of "[tihe total damages recoverable by plaintiff reduced by the percentage of
fault including contributory fault, attributed by the trier of fact to other parties, if
any.,,
-, See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(5); IDAHO CODE § 6-918; ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 85, § 2-102; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-22. The
exemption is not universal, however. North Dakota, for example, permits exemplary
damages for malicious or willful conduct. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03(2).
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probably reasoning that disciplining the irresponsible official is
preferable to penalizing the taxpayer.2t The Kentucky Court of
,Appeals recently held as a principle of common law that munic-
ipalities are not subject to punitive damages. 239 The legislature
might also choose to absolve the government from any respon-
sibility for the acts of codefendants by including a provision
that the government's liability is several from that of any other
person or entity.
240
More controversial is the preclusion of recovery for none-
conomic losses such as pain and suffering and emotional distress.
The Kentucky General Assembly already has chosen to omit
recovery for pain and suffering under the Board of Claims
Act. 241 Advocates of plaintiff's rights can argue in opposition
that such a preclusion in a comprehensive governmental liability
statute is both unnecessary and unfair absent any empirical
evidence that it is necessary to prevent unmanageable strains on
governmental resources. House Bill 120 opted for elimination of
any ceiling on damages in favor of a complete bar to recovery
for noneconomic loss. Alternatively, the legislature could exper-
iment with allowance of noneconomic recoveries subject to a
dollar limitation. The General Assembly at least might investi-
gate whether states electing to compensate noneconomic losses
have found this expansion of liability overly burdensome.
2 1 Justice Blackmun discussed the principal rationale for exempting municipalities
from punitive damages in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981):
In general, courts viewed punitive damages as contrary to sound public policy,
because such awards would burden the very taxpayers and citizens for
whose benefit the wrongdoer was being chastised. The courts readily dis-
tinguished between liability to compensate for injuries inflicted by a mu-
nicipality's officers and agents, and vindictive damages appropriate as
punishment for the bad-faith conduct of those same officers and agents.
Compensation was an obligation properly shared by the municipality itself,
whereas punishment properly applied only to the actual wrongdoers. The
courts thus protected the public from unjust punishment, and the munici-
palities from undue fiscal constraints.
Id. at 263.
23 City of Shively v. Craig, 32 Ky. L. Summ. 13, at 1 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1985).
The court relied heavily upon the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Fact Con-
certs, 453 U.S. 247.
2,1 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(E).
-1 See KRS § 44.070(l).
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Finally, in addition to restricting damages, the Kentucky
General Assembly can consider ways in which to limit litigation
expenses. One way to reduce such expenses is to eliminate the
jury trial, either by devising an administrative remedy or, pref-
erably, by following the example of the Federal Tort Claims Act
in requiring bench trials. 242 Another option is to ensure that a
large percentage of the claimant's limited recovery winds up with
the claimant, although any limitation on attorney's fees should
not be so severe that it discourages lawyers from undertaking
representation against the government. 243 Some states have sought
to discourage both frivolous suits and dilatory defenses by au-
thorizing the award of attorney's fees if the party seeldng such
fees demonstrates the bad faith of his adversary.244
2. Specific Exemptions for Certain Governmental Functions
As already suggested in section II(C),24" the legislative, quasi-
legislative, judicial, and quasi-judicial activities of government
merit absolute immunization. Most states, following the lead of
the Federal Tort Claims Act, have chosen instead to immunize
"discretionary functions." 246 Indeed, so irresistible is the impulse
to exempt the exercise of governmental discretion that courts in
several states have militantly created such an exception when the
legislature enacted a liability statute that omitted it.247 However
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976). This is the course recommended by Professor
Davis, although his idea has not gained much ground in the states. See K. DAvis, supra
note 90, at § 27:45.
243 Florida, for example, limits attorneys to 25% of any judgment recovered. FLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 768.28(8).
2" See IDAHO CODE § 6-918(A); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-19.
1' See notes 90, 178-180 supra and accompanying text.
211 The Federal Tort Claims Act is inapplicable to claims "based upon the exercise
of performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
For examples of state statutes immunizing "discretionary functions," see ALASKA
STAT. § 09.65.070(d)(2) (Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-33-2; IDAHO CODE § 6-904(1);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(d); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.03(6) (West 1977); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-12.1-03(3)(c); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205(1); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-
10(1)(a).
24 See, e.g., Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010
(Fla. 1979); Harris v. State, 358 N.E.2d 639 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1976); Weiss v. Fote, 167




time-honored, the exception for discretionary functions is use-
lessly imprecise and invariably necessitates a wasteful course of
"narrowing" through judicial experimentation. The Kentucky
General Assembly should profit from its tardy entry into the
field by learning from the mistakes of its predecessors. It should
forego the exemption of "discretionary functions" in favor of
a more exact immunity for (1) legislative and quasi-legislative
acts, i.e., the making of law and governmental policy, and (2)
judicial and quasi-judicial functions, i.e., those exhibiting the
fundamental attributes of notice, a hearing, and a decision based
on the record.
248
Many less fundamental activities of government may need
the protection of statutory immunity. As the court recognized
in City of Louisville v. Louisville Seed Co., "catastrophic lia-
bilities from many suits might dissuade public officials from
engaging in beneficial functions to the general detriment of the
public. ' 249 The limitation of recoverable damages can address
sufficiently the spectre of financial catastrophe, but even this
may not suffice to save from extinction what I would call
"marginal" governmental functions-services that are beneficial
but not essential to government. This description is unavoidably
vague, but safety, health, and other types of inspections per-
formed by governmental agents furnish a good example. Such
inspections undeniably are desirable, but harried local govern-
ments may elect to abandon them if every fire or fall down a
stairway results in the inclusion of the government as a defendant
whose careless inspection may somehow have contributed to the
loss.
What follows, then, is a shopping list of governmental serv-
ices that other jurisdictions have immunized specifically by stat-
ute. Many of them hardly qualify as "marginal." For example,
several states have chosen to exempt from liability every form
of police activity as well as the operation of jails, prisons, and
141 See text accompanying notes 88-102 supra. Probably the single greatest flaw of
House Bill 120 was its retention of immunity for "[a]ny claim arising from the exercise
of judgment or discretion vested in the local government . . . ." The bill went on to list
specific functions that were included as discretionary, but it still invited and probably
necessitated endless judicial interpretation of the "exercise of judgment or discretion."
-1 433 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Ky. 1968).
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other institutions of confinement 350 The wisdom of this is ques-
tionable, since these functions frequently are subject to damage
suits in federal court anyway, 251 and exposure to suit has not
driven government out of the business of opposing crime. With
this in mind, each of these exceptions is worthy of consideration
and discussion. No statute contains them all.
The Kentucky General Assembly could elect to immunize
state and local governments from liability for injuries arising
from:
1. The natural condition of unimproved property; 
2
2. The condition of a reservoir, dam, canal, conduit, drain,
or similar structure when used by a person for a pur-
pose that is not foreseeable;253
3. Any claim for injuries resulting from the use of any
public property intended or permitted to be used as a
park, playground, or open area for recreational pur-
poses, unless the governmental entity or an employee
thereof is guilty of gross and wanton negligence proxi-
mately causing such injury;21
4
4. The condition of an unpaved road, trail, or footpath,
the purpose of which is to provide access to a recreation
or scenic area;255
5. The adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt
or enforce a law (including rules and regulations);21
6
6. An act or omission performed in good faith and with-
out malice under the apparent authority of a statute
I See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 36-33-3 (exempting torts of policemen); OiKA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 51, § 155(6) (exempting failure to provide police, law enforcement, or fire
protection); id. § 155(22) (exempting operation of jail or correctional facility, or injuries
from escape of prisoner or by prisoner to prisoner).
' See text accompanying notes 112-23 supra.
22 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 831.2; IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3(1); IA.
STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(o); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(10); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-
30-10(11).
" See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 831.8; IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3(2).
2M See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 3-106; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(n); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 59:2-7 (West 1982).
"I See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 831.4; IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3(4).
21 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818.2; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-103; IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3(7); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(a) & (C); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
466.03(5); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-4; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(4).
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that is invalid, if the employee would not have been
liable had the statute been valid;
2 7
7. The act or omission of someone other than the govern-
mental entity employee; 258
8. The issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or
failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke,
any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or sim-
ilar authorization, where the authority is discretionary
under the law;259
9. Failure to make an inspection, or making an inadequate
or negligent inspection, of any property, other than the
property of a governmental entity, to determine whether
the property complied with or violates any law or con-
tains a hazard to health or safety;
260
10. Entry upon any property where the entry is expressly
or impliedly authorized by law;26'
11. Assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, ma-
licious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract
rights;
262
12 Theft by another person of money in the employee's
official custody, unless the loss was sustained because
21 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-904(l); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-203; IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3(8); NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-2409(1) (1983); OR. REv. STAT. §
30.265(0.
I See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.8; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-204; IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3(9).
"I See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 09.65.070(d)(3); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818.4; ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 85, § 2-104; IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3(10); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-5;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(12); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205(3); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 63-30-10(I)(c).
1w See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.070(d)(1)(A); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818.6; ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-105; IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3(11); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-
61040); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-6; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(13); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-20-205(4); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(1)(d).
214 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-209; IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3(12);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(9).
"I See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818.8 (misrepresentation); IDAHO CODE § 6-904(4);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-106 (oral promise and misrepresentation) and § 2-107 (liable
and slander); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3(13) (misrepresentation); NEB. REv. STAT. §
23-2409(5); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 155(17) (misrepresentation); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-20-205(2); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(1)(b) & (f).
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of the employee's own negligent or wrongful act or
omission;
263
13. Civil disobedience, riot, insurrection or rebellion, or the
failure to j rovide, or the method of providing, police,
law enforcement, or fire protection;264
14. Any claim based upon the theory of attractive nuis-
ance;265
15. Snow or ice conditions or temporary or natural condi-
tions on any public way or other public place due to
weather condition, unless the condition is affirmatively
caused by the negligent act of a political subdivision; 6
16.. Assessment or collection of taxes or special assessments,
license or registration fees, or other fees or charges
imposed by law;267
17. Any claim covered by any workers' compensation act
or any employer's liability act;
26
18. The absence, condition, location, or malfunction of any
traffic or road sign, signal or warning device, unless
the absence, condition, location or malfunction is not
corrected by the political subdivision responsible within
a reasonable time after actual or constructive notice, or
the removal or destruction of such signs, signals, or
See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 822; IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3(14); OxIL.
STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(19).
2,, See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 845 (police protection), 850-50.8 (fire protection);
GA. CODE ANN. § 36-33-3 (torts of policemen); IDAHO CODE § 6-904(7); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 85, §§ 4-102 (police protection), 5-101 (failure to provide fire protection), 5-102
(failure to suppress or contain fire) (Smith-Hurd 1966); IAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(m)
(1984) (police and fire protection); OrI.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(6); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 30.265(e) (riot); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205(7) (riots, demonstrations); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 63-30-10(l)(g).
26 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(7).
26 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 831; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 3-105; IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3(3); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(k); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.03(4);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(8).
26, See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-904(2); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(e); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 466.03(3); NEB. REv. STAT. § 23-2409(3); OKa.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §
155(11); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.265(b); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205(8); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 63-30-10(1)(h).
2I See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(0; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.03(2); NEa.




warning devices by third parties, action of weather
elements or as a result of traffic collision except on
failure of the political subdivision to correct the same
within a reasonable time after actual or constructive
notice;269
19. Any claim that is limited or barred by any other law; 270
20. An act or omission of an independent contractor or his
employees, agents, subcontractors, or suppliers or of a
person other than an employee of the political subdi-
vision at the time the act or omission occurred;27'
21. Participation in or practice for any interscholastic or
other athletic contest sponsored or conducted by or on
the property of a political subdivision;2
72
22. Provision, equipping, operation, or maintenance of any
jail or correctional facility, or injuries resulting from
the escape of a prisoner or by a prisoner to any other
prisoner; 273
23. Injury to the person or property of a person under
supervision of a governmental entity and who is on
probation or assigned to an alcohol or drug services
program or a minimum security release program or
community corrections program;2 74
24. Any claim or action based upon the theory of manu-
facturer's products liability or breach of warranty, either
express or implied; 275
25. The imposition or establishment of a quarantine by a
governmental entity, whether such quarantine relates to
persons or property;
276
z See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.4; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 3-104; KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(g); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(15).
'° See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(h); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466.03(7); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(16); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.265(d).
17, See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(18). Cf. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.4
(public entity liable for act of independent contractor to same extent as private person).
212 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(20).
"I See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 845.2-846 (West 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85,
§§ 4-103 (failure to provide or maintain jail) and 4-106 (determining parole or escape of
prisoner); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(23); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(1)(J).
2" See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(21).
271 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(24).
116 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-904(3); NEB. REv. STAT. § 23-2409(4).
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26. The activities of the state national guard when engaged
in combatant activities in a time of war or when en-
gaged in training or duty under 32 U.S.C. §§ 316, 502,
503, 504, 505, or 709,277 where the claim arising there-
from is payable under the provisions of the National
Guard Claims Act, 278 except that a claimant not com-
pensated in whole or in part under the Nation Guard
Claims Act may assert his claim under the state tort
claims statute;
279
27. The plan or design for the construction of or an im-
provement to public property, either in its original con-
struction or any improvement thereto, if the plan or
design is approved in advance of the construction or
improvement by the governing body of the governmen-
tal entity or some other body or employee exercising
discretionary authority to give such approval and if the
plan or design was prepared in conformity with the
generally recognized and prevailing standards in exist-
ence at the time such plan or design was prepared.no
Obviously, inclusion of all of these "exceptions" in a single
statute would restore governmental immunity more thoroughly
than did "Louisville Seed and Frankfort Variety Inc. v. City of
Frankfort.281 The Kentucky General Assembly must exercise cau-
tion in avoiding this result. One of the principal benefits of a
statute is that it lends itself to experiment and adjustment. The
legislature need not achieve the perfect equilibrium between pro-
tection and compensation at one stroke. Once the basic statute
is in place, the legislature can add to or subtract from govern-
mental liability as the effects of its effort become known. Cer-
tainly any serious miscalculations of the government's ability to
support a new area of liability can be addressed swiftly. Instead
of expecting the advent of the apocalypse and "overimmuniz-
32 U.S.C. §§ 316, 502, 503, 504, 505, 709 (1985).
Id. § 715 (1985).
See, e.g., CA. GOV'T CODE § 816; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-904(5) & (6); OIu.A.
STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 151(22); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(l)(i).
See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 830.6; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-904(8); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-6104(1).
-- 552 S.W.2d 653 (Ky. 1977). See text accompanying note 53 supra.
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ing," therefore, the General Assembly should begin by protect-
ing only services that almost certainly would prove unaffordable
if subjected even to limited liability.
2 2
3. Defense and Indemnification of Governmental Employees
The Kentucky Employees Defense Act2 3 serves as a tacit
recognition that the state government has an obligation to defend
and to protect financially, at least to some extent, employees
who are subject to suit for their official acts.284 The Kentucky
General Assembly should extend this policy by statute to the
county and municipal levels and should provide for indemnifi-
cation of such employees up to the limits established for liability
of the governmental entity itself. 85 Some states have simply
immunized governmental employees, at least to the extent that
recourse against the government itself is available.28 6 Kentucky
2 My choice for a "minimal" statute of exemptions, a choice based mainly upon
the frequency of their inclusion in statutes of other states, would be those exceptions
enumerated 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, and 18 in the text accompanying notes 152-78
supra.
Z, KRS § 12.211 (1985). See also Comment The Employee Defense Act: Wearing
Down Sovereign Immunity, 66 Ky. L.J. 150 (1977-78).
- KRS §§ 12.211-.220 (1985) and 10 KY. ADMIN. REGs. 1:010 (1985) provide for
defense, but reimbursement of the employee depends upon the "economic feasibility"
of the state's obtaining insurance, maximum coverage being limited to $50,000. Id. § 5.
r'- As Professor Davis has observed in the constitutional context, "[J]ust as the
United States should be liable for damages for a violation of the Constitution by a
federal employee within the scope of employment, a state or local government should
be liable for damages for a violation of the Constitution by an employee within the
scope of employment, and the employee should not be liable to the injured person."
DAvIS, supra note 90, § 27:45, at 246. See also id. § 27:4. But cf. Justice Stephenson's
dissent in Gas Service: "Let the case be tried against the individual or individuals
committing the tort. Thus, the injured party is not precluded from obtaining judgment
against the guilty party." 687 S.W.2d at 152-53 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
For a simple but thorough indemnification provision, see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
51, § 161. The governmental body must indemnify the employee for any judgment based
upon an act within the scope of his employment, except for those involving fraud and
corruption and so long as the employee cooperates in good faith in the defense of the
claim. Id. § 161(B).
I" See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(9)(a); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-5; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 160. The Oklahoma statute gives the state the right to recover
funds spent in defending or paying a claim against an employee if the employee's
conduct was outside the scope of his employment or if the employee failed to cooperate
in his defense. Id.
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probably does not have this option. In Happy v. Erwin,2 the
Court concluded that sections fourteen and fifty-four of the
Kentucky Constitution invalidated a statute barring suits against
municipal officers and employees for use of fire apparatus out-
side city limits. 288 Thus, officers and employees remain suscep-
tible to claims, and the government can only cover the cost of
defense and judgment.
289
Normally, the government or its insurer will satisfy the judg-
ment on behalf of itself and the culpable employee up to the
limit of liability established by the Kentucky General Assembly.
Because of the constitutional obstacle to immunizing employees,
however, the employee will bear the burden of satisfying any
judgment in excess of that limit.290 More justifiably, governmen-
tal employees will bear the full risk of their willful, reckless, or
malicious actions; they remain exposed to punitive damages even
if their governmental employer may escape such liability by
statute.2
91
A separate but related question is whether the government
itself should be immune from all liability for the reckless or
intentional acts of its agents. Although some states have adopted
such an exemption,292 government should assume responsibility
for all actions of its employees so long as they have acted in
330 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 159).
I d. at 413.
21 The law of official, as opposed to governmental, immunity is a chamber of
horrors in its own right. In Thompson v. Hueckler, 559 S.W.2d 488 (Ky. Ct. App.
1977), the court adopted RESTATEIJENT (SEcoND) Op TORTS section 895D, which confers
absolute liability on an official "engaged in the exercise of a discretionary function."
The comments to section 895D invite the courts to weigh no fewer than seven factors
in determining whether a function is discretionary.
m Availability of insurance may ameliorate this risk in many instances. See text
accompanying notes 188-92 infra.
1' Punitive damages are recoverable in Kentucky "only when the circumstances
surrounding a tortious act indicate malice, willfulness or a reckless or wanton disregard
for the rights of others." Island Creek Coal Co. v. Rodgers, 644 S.W.2d 339, 347 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1982).
"I See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(9)(a). New Jersey does not hold public
entities liable for acts or omissions of public employees "constituting a crime, actual
fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-10. Another way
of accomplishing this is to remove governmental immunity only for "negligent" acts.
E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-205. This is, in fact, the way The Kentucky Board of
Claims Act reads. KRS § 44.070(1).
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their official capacity. The law should not deprive a seriously
injured person of adequate compensation merely because the
government's agent was reckless or malicious rather than merely
negligent. Preferable to an exemption would be a provision
exacting payment of contribution or indemnity to the govern-
ment by an employee who recklessly, deliberately, or maliciously
injures another. 293
4. Insurance
Most statutes regulating governmental liability include a pro-
vision authorizing local governments to purchase insurance cov-
ering their liability and that of their employees. 29 4 States differ
widely in their use of insurance to mitigate the financial burden
accompanying the abolition of traditional immunity. North Car-
olina, for example, makes municipal liability contingent upon
the purchase of insurance; immunity is "waived" only to the
extent that indemnity is available under the insurance contract. 295
Colorado takes this approach a step farther. It abolishes im-
munity for narrow categories of acts, such as the operation of
motor vehicles and dangerous conditions in public facilities, 296
but empowers public entities to waive immunity in other areas
to the extent they are insured.
297
The drawback of a policy equating insurance coverage with
waiver of immunity is that it enables a municipality or other
political body to "elect" immunity for all or most of its actions
simply by neglecting to secure coverage. A more equitable so-
lution is to combine a damages limitation with a provision
authorizing an elective increase in exposure through the purchase
of insurance. Thus, several states require a governmental body
to pay claims up to the limits established by statute, but permit
them to pay larger claims up to the limit of any applicable
insurance contract. 298 The existence of insurance coverage may
- ' See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-903(d).
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6111; TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-403.
.' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1982). The statute also authorizes a city to
purchase insurance to cover its officials and employees. Id.
-" CoLo. Ray. STAT. § 24-10-106 (1982).
Id. at § 24-10-104.
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-926; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6111; MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 466.06; TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-403; UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-34.
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even enable the local government to waive the immunity for
services otherwise exempted specifically by statute.299
As a practical matter, of course, the scarcity or cost of
available coverage may force a local government to confine its
exposure as closely as possible to the limitations on liability
established by statute. Nevertheless, for many ordinary risks,
such as motor vehicle and premises liability, a local government
may find it possible to effect higher limits of recovery through
coverage in excess of statutory limits on damages. Certainly the
Kentucky General Assembly can do little harm in giving local
governments these options.
CONCLUSION
The Kentucky General Assembly has turned its face too long
from the ever-present problem of governmental liability. It has
chosen the easier course of allowing the judiciary to stumble
along in a doomed effort to draw a single, satisfactory line
between the interest of those injured by government and those
who must pay for and conduct government. The judiciary has
borne this burden earnestly, but with the poor results chronicled
in these pages. Although the Kentucky Supreme Court has an-
nounced a fresh start, the net result is that the law of govern-
mental liability is no more settled than it was twenty years, or
even a century, ago.
This is not a situation that reflects great credit on the orderly
process of democratic government in response to public and
private need. If state and local government in Kentucky cannot
survive the assumption of financial responsibility for official
acts, the General Assembly should at least announce this mel-
ancholy conclusion after study and reflection. If government in
many circumstances can pay for injuries that it causes, as seems
more likely, then further delay is inexcusable. More than two
decades after the failed experiment of Haney, the answer to the
problem is not a resurrection of that decision, but an end to the
legislative indifference that necessitated it. Having once again
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-2413 (constitutes a waiver only to such extent
as stated in insurance policy).
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allowed a regular session to slip by without taking any action,
the General Assembly should confront the issue of local govern-
mental liability at its next opportunity.

